The Role of CEO’s Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility

Fabrizi, Michele; Mallin, Christine; Michelon, G.

doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1864-2

Cited by 317 publications

(282 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Although this measure has been used in several previous studies (e.g., Fabrizi et al, 2013;Martínez-Ferrero et al, 2016) Future studies could reinforce the findings by increasing the period and the sample of analysis to additional countries. First, the main limitation corresponds to the CSR measure, which is calculated as the unweighted sum of different indicators based on numerical scales.…”

Section: Figure 1 Research Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 74%

Does corporate social responsibility affect tax avoidance: Evidence from family firms

López-González

Martínez‐Ferrero

García‐Meca

2019

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

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The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effect of corporate social responsibility performance on tax avoidance. It also examines whether family ownership affects tax avoidance practices by socially responsible performance. Based on an international sample of 6,442 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014, we use several panel-data regression models. We find that social and environmental performance is negatively related with tax avoidance so that firms with a greater socially responsible performance show a lower tax-saving practices. However, we find that this negative relation is lower in family-owned firms, what suggests that despite the fact that family firms show a greater socially responsible behavior aimed to preserve their socioemotional endowments, family ownership is positively associated with tax avoidance practices.

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Section: Figure 1 Research Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 74%

Does corporate social responsibility affect tax avoidance: Evidence from family firms

López-González

Martínez‐Ferrero

García‐Meca

2019

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

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“…(1) Stakeholder pressure: Some kind of pressure from the relationship with stakeholders [4,34] and from stakeholder dialogue [89], from one or several stakeholders including NGOs [90], appears to be the most commonly mentioned aspect in favor of CSR in the organization, cited in 25.8% of the papers. The objective drivers cited include social demands [48] and stakeholders' expectations and pressures [45].…”

Section: Drivers Of and Barriers To Csr Strategies: Content Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite the long history of CSR, no consensus has been reached among the industry participants, academics or other interested parties on its precise definition, while they also recognize the complexity Sustainability 2017, 9, 1821 2 of 24 of the drivers and barriers that affect CSR [4]. One reason for this might be that a very diverse and multidimensional set of issues, ranging from climate change and environmental conservation to human rights and labor practices, is discussed under the category of CSR [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility Drivers and Barriers According to Managers’ Perception; Evidence from Spanish Firms

2017

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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is becoming a dominant issue in both research and practice of management. However, the underlying processes in the relationship between the degree of development of CSR in companies and the drivers/barriers that determine this development are still at the center of an intense debate. The purpose of this empirical study is to examine these relationships. We investigate a sample of 416 Spanish firms; based on a multifactorial framework, our study considers both the subjective and objective drivers/barriers, analyzing their joint effect on the final degree of sustainability. A structural equation model is established and a Bayesian approach is used, enabling exact inferences about the model's parameters and handling missing data with random imputation, thus increasing the study's reliability. The results show that this degree is related to what managers believe CSR to be (subjective drivers/barriers) and what managers expect it to accomplish or outcomes (objective drivers/barriers).

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“…This approach is consistent with previous research using industry-mean values as an instrument for the endogenous variable. For instance, Fabrizi, Mallin and Michelon (2014) use the yearly mean of the equity incentives and bonuses provided to the CEOs of all firms belonging to the 2-digits SIC code of the firm as an instrument for executives' incentives. Similarly, Bozzolan, Fabrizi, Mallin and Michelon (2015) use as an instrument for CSR orientation of firm i in year t the mean of the CSR orientation in year t of all firms belonging to firm is 2-digits SIC code.…”

Section: Multivariate Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO Risk Incentives and Real Earnings Management

Fabrizi¹,

Parbonetti²

2016

IJBM

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Previous research shows that companies use option compensation to motivate managers to accept risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Indeed, risk adverse CEOs are likely to accept less risk than that accepted by diversified shareholders (Fama & French, 1992). Nonetheless, not all risks produce the expected benefits and risk has an intrinsic cost, such as potential large losses, that cannot be eliminated. Therefore, given CEO risk incentives, real earnings management can be viewed as a mechanism used to avoid the undesirable consequences of risk on reported earnings. However, engaging in real earnings management requires cutting investments, such as R&D, that have a well-documented association with firm's future risk profile (Comin & Philippon, 2005). As a consequence, the use of real earnings management by CEOs with high-risk incentives as a tool for mitigating the intrinsic costs of risk is an empirical question that we tackle in this paper. Using a sample of quarterly observations from US firms over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010], and an instrumental variable approach to overcome endogeneity concerns, we show that CEOs with high risk-related incentives engage less in real activity manipulations that encompass cutting discretionary expenditures than do executives with low incentives. These findings are consistent with the idea that CEOs incentivized on risk avoid engaging in real management activities that can decrease firm's future risk profile.

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The Role of CEO’s Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility

Cited by 317 publications

References 49 publications

Does corporate social responsibility affect tax avoidance: Evidence from family firms

Does corporate social responsibility affect tax avoidance: Evidence from family firms

Corporate Social Responsibility Drivers and Barriers According to Managers’ Perception; Evidence from Spanish Firms

CEO Risk Incentives and Real Earnings Management

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