The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding

Abstract

One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible than the inferential theory.

Immediate and Reflective Senses

“…3 Number concepts. My first example is adapted from David Bourget's (2017) discussion of number concepts. When we think about numbers, especially large numbers, we are not immediately aware of the numbers themselves but rather of the numerals that stand for them, perhaps in addition to a rough ballpark sense of their magnitudes.…”

The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought

“…‘The idea here is that there is a sense in which, when we think, the concepts we think with are often not fully explicit in the thought itself’ (Montague : 177). Bourget () shares this view and argues for it in terms of the differing degrees to which one can be said to ‘grasp’ a proposition. It may be the case that most of the time we ‘do not fully and occurrently grasp the complete and precise contents that we express or may plausibly be attributed’ (Bourget : 22).…”

“…Bourget () shares this view and argues for it in terms of the differing degrees to which one can be said to ‘grasp’ a proposition. It may be the case that most of the time we ‘do not fully and occurrently grasp the complete and precise contents that we express or may plausibly be attributed’ (Bourget : 22). The source of the confusion resides in the dogma that phenomenal consciousness ‘has to be somehow self‐intimating in a way that registers across the board in cognition’ (Bourget : 23).…”

“…It may be the case that most of the time we ‘do not fully and occurrently grasp the complete and precise contents that we express or may plausibly be attributed’ (Bourget : 22). The source of the confusion resides in the dogma that phenomenal consciousness ‘has to be somehow self‐intimating in a way that registers across the board in cognition’ (Bourget : 23). Once we rid ourselves of this dogma, as Merleau‐Ponty invites us to do, we can understand the introspective availability of the content of thought analogously to the perceptual availability of the content of perception.…”

Phenomenal dispositions

“…A popular strategy for explaining the intentionality of persistent mental states is to claim that they are dispositions to undergo a mental episode that has phenomenal character. To have a belief with a content p is to be disposed to undergo an occurrent mental episode with a phenomenal character Q that determines p. This strategy is endorsed by Bourget (2010Bourget ( , 2017, Kriegel (2011), and Searle (1983Searle ( , 1990Searle ( , 1991.…”