The Role of Expectations in the Provision of Public Goods Under the Influence of Social Identity

Abstract

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States or social networks? Popular attitudes amid health crises in the Middle East and North Africa

“…Rather than economic status, people might quite well look at themselves predominantly as members of a particular social community, such as family, neighbourhood, tribe, ethnicity, or religious community. Scholars have shown that a common social identity increases in-group cooperation for the production of a common good (Lankau et al, 2014). If this holds true for the context of a health crisis, we would assume those individuals emphasizing a communal identity – based on allegiance to tribe, ethnic group, or religious community – would be driven by in-group solidarity.…”

Social Environment and Forms of Governance -- Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment and the Role of Emotions

“…As Figure 1 shows, the presence of BP institution eliminates the often documented downward trend of contributions over time (see Fehr and Gächter 2000;Keser and van Winden 2000;Vyrastekova 2011;Lankau et al 2013), independent of the social environment. The average contributions of the first period range between 55% and 68% of total endowment.…”

“…Experimental research has shown that contributions to common goods decrease over time (see e.g. Keser and van Winden 2000, Fischbacher and Gächter 2010, Lankau et al 2013. Nevertheless, the possibility of peer-punishment imposed by group members without a central authority has been investigated as an effective institution providing incentive for compliance and enforcing long-term cooperation in social dilemma games.…”