The Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann

doi:10.3390/g7020013

Cited by 15 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…For instance, research has shown that corruption increases when individuals interact repeatedly with the same partner (Abbink, 2004), that the route to corruption leads over a steep cliff rather than down a slippery slope (Köbis et al, 2017), and that descriptive norms affect corruption (Köbis et al, 2015). Moreover, studies have shown that individuals are willing to punish corrupt behavior (Cameron et al, 2009;Chaudhuri et al, 2016). However, no systematic research has yet investigated the role of individuals who allow the corruption to result in a beneficial outcome for the corrupt individual by covering up the initial transgression (but see Gino & Bazerman, 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

Buying Unethical Loyalty: A Behavioral Paradigm and Empirical Test

Thielmann

Böhm

Hilbig

2020

Social Psychological and Personality Science

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Unethical behavior is often accompanied by others covering up a transgressor’s actions. We devised a novel behavioral paradigm, the Unethical Loyalty Game (ULG), to study individuals’ willingness to lie to cover up others’ dishonesty. Specifically, we examined (i) whether and to what extent individuals are willing to lie to cover up others’ unethical behavior, (ii) whether this unethical loyalty depends on the benefits (bribe) at stake, and (iii) whether trait Honesty–Humility accounts for interindividual variability in unethical loyalty. In a fully incentivized experiment ( N = 288), we found a high prevalence of lying to cover up others’ unethical behavior, which increased with increasing bribes. In turn, unethical loyalty decreased with individuals’ Honesty–Humility levels. Overall, the findings show that most but not all individuals are corruptible to disguise others’ transgressions. Future research using the ULG can help to further illuminate (the determinants of) this prevalent type of unethical behavior.

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confidence: 99%

Buying Unethical Loyalty: A Behavioral Paradigm and Empirical Test

Thielmann

Böhm

Hilbig

2020

Social Psychological and Personality Science

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“…For example, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) introduced first and second movers' roles as "firm" and "public official," respectively, and changed the labels associated with decision options to "private payment" and "grant permission." A similar framing strategy has been followed in a number of other papers (Abbink et al, 2014;Barr and Serra, 2009;Chaudhuri et al, 2016), even using a very direct word such as "bribe" in some (Alatas et al, 2009;Banerjee, 2016;Cameron et al, 2009).…”

Section: Experimental Studies Of Bribery and Relevant Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab

Senci

Hasrun

Moro

et al. 2019

Rationality and Society

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In most bribery games in the literature, there is no mention of rights and duties associated to participants’ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loaded frames, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitly signal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants’ interpretation of these factors may not be univocal. In this study, a participant in the role of a common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetary benefit and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role of public official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providing the benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditions with/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/absence of negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official’s duty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other bribery games in the literature which rely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information on rights and duties. We found that both the presence of externalities and information about rights were effective bribery deterrents, and that bribe offers and acceptances were most discouraged with their synergic effect. Interestingly, officials followed prescriptive information even when it was inefficient to do so (when there were no externalities), and implied choosing against their material self-interest (by rejecting a bribe), and not reciprocating bribe offers. We conclude by highlighting the limits of making generalizations from results without explicit normative information and the relevance of present findings as anti-corruption behavioral insights.

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“…Desde el punto de vista experimental, se ha recurrido a variaciones del marco para resaltar las connotaciones morales y normativas de una situación de coimas (Abbink y Hennig-Schmidt, 2006;Banerjee, 2016;Barr y Serra, 2009;Chaudhuri, Paichayontvijit, y Sbai, 2016). Las variaciones del marco comúnmente han involucrado cambios en los nombres asociados a los roles de los participantes (por ejemplo, "participante A" y "participante B" en la versión abstracta o neutra, versus "empresa" o "ciudadano" y "funcionario público" en la versión semánticamente cargada) y las palabras utilizadas para designar algunas de las acciones disponibles ("transferencia" versus "pago privado" o "coima" en los marcos neutro y cargado, respectivamente).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

“…Las variaciones del marco comúnmente han involucrado cambios en los nombres asociados a los roles de los participantes (por ejemplo, "participante A" y "participante B" en la versión abstracta o neutra, versus "empresa" o "ciudadano" y "funcionario público" en la versión semánticamente cargada) y las palabras utilizadas para designar algunas de las acciones disponibles ("transferencia" versus "pago privado" o "coima" en los marcos neutro y cargado, respectivamente). No obstante, la comparación de estas variaciones del marco ha arrojado resultados mixtos: ausencia de efecto de marco (Abbink y Hennig-Schmidt, 2006;Cameron et al, 2009), presencia de efecto de marco (Banerjee, 2016;Chaudhuri, Paichayontvijit y Sbai, 2016); Barr y Serra (2009) presentan resultados mixtos dependientes del nivel de externalidad negativa involucrada.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified