We here studied some potential factors underlying variation in compliance with preventive behaviors against COVID‐19 by studying mask wearing during outdoor recreational activities in a midsize city of Argentina in 2020. The originality of present research relies on the complementation of observational (N = 15,507) and survey (N = 578) data and in assessing the determinants of and disposition to the same preventive behavior across activities. In Study 1, we did 8 weeks of unobtrusive systematic observation of mask wearing in outdoor recreational sites as a function of activity (walking, running, and cycling). In Study 2, we ran an online survey (concomitant with the last weeks of the observational study) to measure self‐reported mask use and relevant beliefs, including self‐ and other‐regarding motives. Behavioral observations showed that mask wearing declined over time for the three activities as predicted from a social dilemma perspective; nonetheless, compliance significantly differed across activities. Self‐reported mask use was predicted by the perceived risk of contagion for the self and for others, perceived comfort costs of wearing masks, and social norms, but not by perceived illness severity or mask effectiveness. We discuss some implications and limitations of present findings for the development of preventive strategies to reduce COVID‐19 transmission.

In most bribery games in the literature, there is no mention of rights and duties associated to participants’ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loaded frames, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitly signal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants’ interpretation of these factors may not be univocal. In this study, a participant in the role of a common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetary benefit and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role of public official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providing the benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditions with/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/absence of negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official’s duty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other bribery games in the literature which rely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information on rights and duties. We found that both the presence of externalities and information about rights were effective bribery deterrents, and that bribe offers and acceptances were most discouraged with their synergic effect. Interestingly, officials followed prescriptive information even when it was inefficient to do so (when there were no externalities), and implied choosing against their material self-interest (by rejecting a bribe), and not reciprocating bribe offers. We conclude by highlighting the limits of making generalizations from results without explicit normative information and the relevance of present findings as anti-corruption behavioral insights.

Some authors propose that gender norms pose divergent effects on generosity, usually being women the gender expected to be kinder. Indeed, some economic experiments show women to be more generous than men in the Dictator Game (DG). Despite some claiming these results to be determined by socialization into gender norms, data do not speak against a biological explanation of sex differences. In fact, there is evidence that DG generosity varies with the level of pre-natal exposure to testosterone and estrogens, as indirectly measured using participants´ 2D:4D digit ratios. In any case, it is unclear whether DG generosity expresses pure altruism or compliance with social norms. Socialization and biological factors may have diverse effects on these two different motivations. In the present study, we aimed at contributing to this discussion. We randomly assigned participants to two independent conditions. In the prescriptive norm condition, participants were incentivized to accurately estimate others´ opinion about the most socially appropriate option in the DG (i.e., the prescriptive norm), and then made their decisions as dictators. Participants in the control conditions made their decisions as dictators without any prior estimation. We found that the normative exercise increased generosity (relative to the control condition) in women but not in men. In a sub-sample, we also measured participants´ 2D:4D digit ratios as a proxy of a socialization-free sex-dimorphic hormonal influence on behavior. We found no evidence that the normative effect of the estimation exercise was modulated by participants´ digit ratios. In contrast, generosity in the control condition was higher, the more extreme (highest and lowest) the digit ratios were. We conclude in favor of: 1) a socialization-modulated gender effect on responses to prescriptive norms of generosity; and 2) a biological effect of pre-natal hormonal levels on generosity when the norm was not elicited; in this last case, the relationship between pre-natal testosterone and empathic concern might be involved.