The role of professional control in the management of complex organizations

Abstract

The limitations of formal administrative controls in organizations performing complex production tasks have created the need for less obtrusive forms of management control. When formal administrative controls cannot cater to the unpredictability of complex work demands, one strategy is to employ "professionals" who have been trained to cope with these demands and whose behaviour is primarily controlled through social and self-control mechanisms. There is some question, however, as to the effectiveness of this strategy. There is evidence that integrating pmfessionals into bureaucratic organizations creates the potential for a "clash of cultures". Conflict emerges when salaried professionals engage in behaviour directed towards increasing their own autonomy (or in some cases maintaining it) and management implement control systems designed to control that bebaviour. This paper argues that the degree of conflict experienced will depend on the individual role orientation of the professional and the extent to which management confront professionals with bureaucratic administrative systems which restricf their self-regulatory activities. The study was undertaken in a large public teaching hospital in Australia and the results support the theoretical position taken in the paper.Accountants concerned with the management processes which operate within organizations of complex organizations need a "wider vision" (Hopwood, 1976). Nowhere is this more of control and an understanding of the interplay important than in human service organizations between the administrative controls they often where core production activities are dominated design and implement, and the informal cdntrol by professionals. ' Professionals are employed in

An empirical investigation of the principal top management styles in the emphasis of multiple forms of controls

“…As a result of the empirical research on output and behavioral controls, many possible outcomes of, and factors affecting and moderating, the use of such controls are evidenced in the literature (Abernethy and Brownell, 1997;Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995;Eisenhardt, 1985;Kihn, 2001Kihn, , 2007aKihn, , 2007bKihn, , 2008Kren and Kerr, 1993). Likewise, research on strategic performance management systems (e.g., Goold and Quinn, 1990;Kaplan andNorton, 1992, 1996;Lynch and Cross, 1991;Smith 1995), has explained how various kinds of financial and nonfinancial performance measures have been used in various circumstances.…”

Medical professionals’ responses to a DRG performance management system for hospital care in the Netherlands. Reinterpreting ‘perverse effects’, such as upcoding and patient selection, using arguments of professionalism and managerialism

“…Medical procedures including all efforts, activities and services are thus condensed into a series of products, providing a relatively simple metric for monitoring and evaluating professional performance (Abernethy and Stoelwinder 1995, Wallace 1995, Noordegraaf 2006. DRG-based performance management systems provide system managers a tool for evaluating the functioning of hospitals, hospital departments, and medical professionals and to steer based on considerations of cost-efficiency or care expenditures (Preston 1992, Abernethy et al 2006.…”

“…In essence, all of these case-mix systems classify patients into clinically and cost-homogeneous groups (Sutherland and Botz 2006). This makes it possible to condense the activities of medical professionals into a series of "products" that can be measured by system managers and used to steer the system towards better performance (Abernethy and Stoelwinder 1995, Wallace 1995, Noordegraaf 2006). …”

“…As DRG systems are used to classify patients based on their medical condition and cost of treatment, they are also referred to as "case-mix systems" (Sutherland and Botz 2006). Reimbursement of medical institutions based on patient classification effectively divides the full medical process into a number of uniform products, which are measurable and provide policymakers and managers a tool for monitoring and steering based on professional performance (Abernethy and Stoelwinder 1995, Wallace 1995, Noordegraaf 2006. Public-and sometimes also private stakeholders use DRG systems for purposes of resource allocation and accountability.…”

Une voie de compréhension du contrôle de gestion dans les organisations non marchandes : la métaphore de l’iceberg

“…Nous avons ainsi montré Une voie de compréhension du contrôle de gestion dans les organisations non marchandes : la métaphore de l'iceberg dans nos travaux que, dans les organisations culturelles par exemple, l'importance des réalisations artistiques par rapport aux autres enjeux, incitait les acteurs porteurs du projet culturel à revendiquer une marge de liberté excessive et, par conséquent, à refuser les outils et procédures du contrôle de gestion dans lesquels ils voyaient un risque de limitation de leur latitude dans la mise en oeuvre de leur stratégie. Les systèmes de contrôle de gestion peuvent, en effet, diminuer la liberté d'action des professionnels et engendrer des phénomènes de résistance liés au hiatus entre le comportement des opérationnels, visant à préserver leur autonomie, et les systèmes de contrôle, cherchant à réduire cette autonomie (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995). De même, la professionnalisation et l'intensifi cation de la gestion peuvent contribuer à modifi er l'équilibre des pouvoirs et rencontrer, de ce fait, une résistance de la part des acteurs opérationnels.…”