Why are some peacekeeping mandates broad and expansive while others are narrow and well defined? Does variation in mandate flexibility reflect the needs inherent in resolving the conflict or the political interests of powerful states? The modern thread of debate surrounding UN action focuses on whether the political interests of the Permanent Five (P5) members in the Security Council or the stated goals of the institution as a whole drive UN behavior. While most analyses focus on where the UN intervenes to assess the political "pull" that member states exert on the institution, we examine variation in operational latitude across UN peacekeeping in war-torn states. Our analysis offers three main results. Powerful states do constrain international bureaucracies; however, bureaucratic independence varies with the intrinsic interests of the P5. Further, heterogeneity across powerful state preferences systematically affects bureaucratic flexibility in peacekeeping.Why are some peacekeeping mandates broad and expansive while others are narrow and well defined? Does variation in mandate flexibility reflect the needs inherent to resolving the conflict or the political interests of powerful states? Since the 1990s, peacekeeping operations have increasingly been sent to civil wars as a tool for managing conflict. Peacekeeping has grown in scope and scale, ranging from small, unarmed observer missions to enforcement missions employing tens of thousands of troops tasked with providing security for vulnerable populations using "all means necessary," language that signifies the use of force beyond self-defense. With the proliferation of missions, questions have arisen as to why some conflicts get missions while others do not. Various studies have shown that where missions go depends on a variety of factors, including need (for example, high fatalities) and political ties (for example, colonial relationships). Concurrently, the UN has undergone significant bureaucratization, a development that delegates functions to experts tasked with the research and day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). This structure was designed to relieve the UN Security Council (UNSC) members from management responsibilities to free up the Council for other issues. Presumably, this also allows the experts to do their jobs without interference once the tasks are delegated (Cortell and Peterson 2006). If this characterization of the UN bureaucracy is how the UN functions in practice, then any political effects should show themselves in the decision to send peacekeepers but no further, meaning the bureaucrats develop and interpret mandates and carry responsibility for outcomes. Currently, the literature on peacekeeping lacks a systematic analysis of what happens once the mission is established. Do the civil servants have the flexibility to address the needs of a fragile peace or are they hindered by political considerations? If politics exert a lingering effect on peacekeeping even after the mission is approved, then...