2008
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0141-6
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The role of utility interdependence in public good experiments

Abstract: Public good experiments, Fairness, Reciprocation, Altruism, C9,

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Cited by 17 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…14 14 In the NOEFF treatment we observe the highest average contribution (80%) of the whole experiment. It is worth noting first that contributions in the NOEFF treatment are surprisingly high if compared to a very similar Dictator Game in the literature.…”
Section: Efficiency Concernsmentioning
confidence: 81%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…14 14 In the NOEFF treatment we observe the highest average contribution (80%) of the whole experiment. It is worth noting first that contributions in the NOEFF treatment are surprisingly high if compared to a very similar Dictator Game in the literature.…”
Section: Efficiency Concernsmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…These conditions resulted in a sizeable increase in contributions. Other experiments that remove strategic interaction in a VCM are [14,15]. 5 The number of subjects allowed to contribute (K) can be greater than one.…”
Section: Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Neral and Ochs, 1992), inform participants that they are matched with subjects from a previous session (e.g. Shapiro, 2009, or transform (part of) the game into an individual decision problem using chance moves (e.g. Anderhub et al, 2002, Charness andLevin, 2009).…”
Section: Searching For Experiments With Computer Playersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Andreoni, 1990;Goeree et al, 2002;Crumpler and Grossman, 2008). A number of previous experimental studies have tested this explanation in repeated linear public goods games by comparing the cooperative behavior of human subjects playing with and without a human counterpart (Houser and Kurzban, 2002;Shapiro, 2009;Ferraro and Vossler, 2010;Di Mauro and Castro, 2011;Yamakawa et al, 2016). In treatments without a human counterpart, the other players are automated, playing according to the distribution of choices of human players from previous sessions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This method of eliminating potential social preferences has been used previously in several experiments on linear public goods games(Houser and Kurzban, 2002;Shapiro, 2009;Ferraro and Vossler, 2010;Di Mauro and Castro, 2011;Yamakawa et al, 2016) and rent-seeking contests(Cox, 2017).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%