The Roles of Incentives and Voluntary Cooperation for Contractual Compliance

Gächter, Simon; Kessler, Esther; Koenigstein, Manfred

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1867043

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(51 reference statements)

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“…Contrary to these results, Gächter et al (2009) find that framing a newly introduced monetary incentive scheme as either punishment or reward is irrelevant in the short term and only marginally relevant in the long term. Although results are mixed, this literature suggests that the use of punishment may erode worker-firm trust more than the use of reward incentive schemes.…”

Section: Methodological Choices and Findingscontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…Workers react to firms giving high compensation and freedom by exerting high effort, but they respond negatively to rigid monetary schemes (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005;Casoria and Riedl, 2013;Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;Fehr et al, 2009;Sliwka, 2007;Sobel, 2005). However, in echoing the insights of motivation theory, there is a recognition, in the labour economics literature, that punishment and rewards may have different effects on workers' moral feelings (Fehr and Gächter, 2002a;Gächter et al, 2009), with punishment having a larger negative effect than rewards (Rey-Biel, 2008).…”

Section: 'Deus Ex Machina': 2 Punishment Employee Motivation and Prod...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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‘You are free to choose . . . are you?’ Organisational punishment as a productivity incentive in the social science literature

et al. 2021

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This paper investigates the theoretical and empirical relationships between organisational punishment and productivity. We do so by highlighting the contributions of two academic fields to this topic: management and economics. We underscore the many common theoretical and empirical grounds across management and economics. We heighten, in particular, how motivation and learning theories have contributed to the development of both theoretical and empirical research on this topic. This paper also argues that this debate could be significantly advanced if insights stemming from industrial relations and labour process theory were also considered since these disciplines have traditionally focussed on macro-issues such as how changes in the economic/institutional contexts may affect the likelihood that organisations will resort to punishment. In order to foster future research on this topic, three research themes were developed: a) freedom of choice and the role of contract completeness; b) perception of punishment, monitoring, and productivity; and c) punishment, productivity and exogenous variables.

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Section: Methodological Choices and Findingscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: 'Deus Ex Machina': 2 Punishment Employee Motivation and Prod...mentioning

confidence: 99%

‘You are free to choose . . . are you?’ Organisational punishment as a productivity incentive in the social science literature

et al. 2021

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Playing ‘hard to get’: An economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior

Schnedler¹,

Vanberg²

2014

European Economic Review

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Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that offering extrinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people's willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this `crowding out' phenomenon, using standard economic arguments. The central idea is that the potential to earn rewards in return for an activity may create incentives to play `hard to get' in an effort to increase those rewards. We discuss two specific contexts in which such incentives arise. In the first, refraining from the activity causes others to attach higher value to it because it becomes scarce. In the second, restraint serves to conceal the actor's intrinsic motivation. In both cases, not engaging in the activity causes others to offer larger rewards. Our theory yields the testable prediction that such effects are likely to occur when a motivated actor enjoys a sufficient degree of `market power.' Key words intrinsic motivation, crowding out, behavioural economics, market power, hidden information JEL Classification: D1, M5, D8, D4, C9 AcknowledgementsWe gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from the editor and two anonymous referees.

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Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts

Prasad¹,

Salmon²

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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The Roles of Incentives and Voluntary Cooperation for Contractual Compliance

Cited by 7 publications

References 42 publications

‘You are free to choose . . . are you?’ Organisational punishment as a productivity incentive in the social science literature

‘You are free to choose . . . are you?’ Organisational punishment as a productivity incentive in the social science literature

Playing ‘hard to get’: An economic rationale for crowding out of intrinsically motivated behavior

Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts

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