The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-communist Democratisation

Stan, Lavinia; Turcescu, Lucian

doi:10.1080/713663138

“…One approach was to subordinate churches (whether Orthodox, Protestant or Catholic) to the communist doctrine, by infiltrating it with informants up to the highest level. For example, while the Romanian Communist party regarded the Orthodox Church as a capitalist remnant, it also believed that a church respected by the bulk of the population could be useful in furthering the party's socioeconomic and political goals (Stan and Turcescu 2000). As a result, the Romanian church was enlisted as a promoter of communist policies in exchange for the government's toleration of a certain level of ecclesiastical activities (Flora and Szilagyi 2005, p. 115).…”

Section: Religion and Communismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The remainder became informants of the communist secret police: even in the dying days of the communist regime, 11 out of the 15 Orthodox bishops, along with the patriarch, were part of the Bulgarian Secret Service (Metodiev 2012, p. 10). In Romania, following the 1949 "social reorientation" programs monastic seminaries and monasteries were closed down and nearly 4,000 monks and nuns were either jailed or forced to accept a secular life (Stan andTurcescu 2000, p. 1468). Similarly, after 1948 the Czechoslovakian regime seized church property and launched an anti-religious campaign in schools and public life.…”

Section: Religion and Communismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communism as the unhappy coming

Djankov

¹

,

Nikolova

²

2018

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe show that Eastern Orthodox believers are less happy compared to those of Catholic and Protestant faith using data covering more than 100 countries around the world. Consistent with the happiness results, we also find that relative to Catholics, Protestants and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital and prefer old ideas and safe jobs. In addition, Orthodoxy is associated with leftleaning political preferences and stronger support for government involvement in the economy. Compared to non-believers and Orthodox adherents, Catholics and Protestants are less likely to agree that government ownership is a good thing, and Protestants are less likely to agree that getting rich can only happen at the expense of others. These differences in life satisfaction and other attitudes and values persisted despite the fact that communist elites sought to eradicate church-going in Eastern Europe, since communists maintained many aspects of Orthodox theology which were useful for the advancement of the communist doctrine. The findings are consistent with Berdyaev's (1933Berdyaev's ( , 1937 hypothesis of communism as a successor of Orthodoxy.

show abstract

“…One approach was to subordinate churches (whether Orthodox, Protestant or Catholic) to the communist doctrine, by infiltrating it with informants up to the highest level. For example, while the Romanian Communist party regarded the Orthodox Church as a capitalist remnant, it also believed that a church respected by the bulk of the population could be useful in furthering the party's socioeconomic and political goals (Stan and Turcescu 2000). As a result, the Romanian church was enlisted as a promoter of communist policies in exchange for the government's toleration of a certain level of ecclesiastical activities (Flora and Szilagyi 2005, p. 115 Second, communist regimes discouraged contractual obligations and legal-based exchanges.…”

Section: Religion and Communismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The remainder became informants of the communist secret police: even in the dying days of the communist regime, 11 out of the 15 Orthodox bishops, along with the patriarch, were part of the Bulgarian Secret Service (Metodiev 2012, p. 10). In Romania, following the 1949 "social reorientation" programs monastic seminaries and monasteries were closed down and nearly 4,000 monks and nuns were either jailed or forced to accept a secular life (Stan andTurcescu 2000, p. 1468). …”

Section: Religion and Communismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communism as the Unhappy Coming

Djankov¹,

Nikolova²

2018

Policy Research Working Papers

4

0

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe show that Eastern Orthodox believers are less happy compared to those of Catholic and Protestant faith using data covering more than 100 countries around the world. Consistent with the happiness results, we also find that relative to Catholics, Protestants and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital and prefer old ideas and safe jobs. In addition, Orthodoxy is associated with leftleaning political preferences and stronger support for government involvement in the economy. Compared to non-believers and Orthodox adherents, Catholics and Protestants are less likely to agree that government ownership is a good thing, and Protestants are less likely to agree that getting rich can only happen at the expense of others. These differences in life satisfaction and other attitudes and values persisted despite the fact that communist elites sought to eradicate church-going in Eastern Europe, since communists maintained many aspects of Orthodox theology which were useful for the advancement of the communist doctrine. The findings are consistent with Berdyaev's (1933Berdyaev's ( , 1937 hypothesis of communism as a successor of Orthodoxy.

show abstract

“…Nevertheless, the Church not only avoided the fate of the local Roman and Greek Catholic Churches, which were subjected to vicious persecution and suppression, but by 1985 had managed to become very vigorous. 105 In time, the Orthodox Church managed to supplant the other churches, though always at the cost of conciliation with the RCP. 106 The suppression of the Greek Catholic Church was the most severe.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%