The Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin, and religious (il)liberalism in Russia

Abstract

The apparent 'symphonia' of church-state cooperation in Russia is a matter of debate and concern in the West. By some accounts the war in Ukraine kicked that collusion into another gear entirely, with the Russian Orthodox Church now a fully assimilated part of the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy machine. We argue that, though such claims may prove hyperbolic, the rise in political authoritarianism in Russia and its neighbourhood is being matched by significant restrictions in Russia's religious playfield, and that both the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church benefit from the policies and practices of the other. Consequently, now is not a good time to be a member of a non-traditional church or of a so-called foreign sect in Russia. More disconcerting, a continuation of these trends may portend further crackdowns not just on religious freedoms, but across the spectrum of civil liberties in Russia.

Human Capital and Sustainable Development in a Religious Context

“…Entrepreneurial activity, striving for enrichment and high material consumption from the point of view of cultures formed based on religions, which transfer the main emphasis to the soul's existence after life, can be assessed by public consciousness as negative. Culture and religion become factors of psychological restraint of entrepreneurship, which is reflected both at the level of human capital realization and in the characteristics of economic growth (Lamoreaux, & Flake, 2018;Qayyum et al, 2019;Smirnov & Miroshnikova, 2019).…”

“…This study uses the term religiosity in a broad sociological sense as the numerous aspects of religious activity, dedication, and belief (Farooq et al, 2019). This paper offers a comparative analysis of human capital development and economic growth in predominantly Orthodox Russia, where 72% of respondents in 2008 identified themselves as Orthodox) (Lamoreaux & Flake, 2018), Kazakhstan, where Muslims form around 70% of the population, and Orthodox citizens account for 26% (Summers et al, 2017), and Protestant countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Each of these three countries has specific features in the manifestation of religiosity and historical features of Protestantism's influence on behavior and economic models (Kersting et al, 2020;Lee et al, 2019;Toprak, 2019).…”

Russia and Information Warfare: a Whole-of-Society Approach

“…33,34 The streak of independence was soon extinguished and the church began participating in Russia's hybrid warfare in Ukraine from the parish to patriarchate level. 35 Thereafter, church actions in the broader region and within Eastern Orthodox community became synchronized with the Kremlin's foreign policy goals. Indeed, regular coordination meetings occur between church and state officials, just like in the case of the media.…”

Rusija ir informacinis karas: visos visuomenės įtraukimo metodas

“…Vėlgi, bandydamas išlaikyti tam tikrą autonomijos pavidalą, patriarchas Kirilas iš pradžių nepritarė Krymo aneksijai ir žiniasklaidos bandymui naudoti stačiatikybę opozicijos pajėgų Donbase įteisinimui 33,34 . Nepriklausomybės laikotarpis netrukus buvo baigtas ir bažnyčia įsitraukė į Rusijos hibridinį karą Ukrainoje nuo parapijų iki patriarchato 35 . Po to bažnyčios veiksmai platesniame regione ir Rytų stačiatikių bendruomenėje buvo derinami su Kremliaus užsienio politikos tikslais.…”