The apparent 'symphonia' of church-state cooperation in Russia is a matter of debate and concern in the West. By some accounts the war in Ukraine kicked that collusion into another gear entirely, with the Russian Orthodox Church now a fully assimilated part of the Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy machine. We argue that, though such claims may prove hyperbolic, the rise in political authoritarianism in Russia and its neighbourhood is being matched by significant restrictions in Russia's religious playfield, and that both the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church benefit from the policies and practices of the other. Consequently, now is not a good time to be a member of a non-traditional church or of a so-called foreign sect in Russia. More disconcerting, a continuation of these trends may portend further crackdowns not just on religious freedoms, but across the spectrum of civil liberties in Russia.

The Arctic has reemerged as a region of geo-political consequence following rapid reduction in sea ice in the past decade. As the only non-NATO Arctic littoral state, Russia's approaches to the many disputes in the region will undoubtedly have the greatest bearing on the future security environment. This article examines the two most threatening circumpolar disputes, sea bed delineation and navigation rights, and postulates that Russia's policies on both issues conform to historical patterns. Recent Russian policy decisions are placed in historical context in order to gauge conflict potential in the Arctic related to these two disputes. The main finding is that the path-dependent trajectories of both issues are becoming ever more distinct as Russia articulates its Arctic policies. In particular, structural and historical factors encourage Moscow toward cooperation and compromise on sea bed negotiations but also suggest that Kremlin intransigence on navigation will continue, with potentially detrimental effect on regional stability.

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