1999
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00136
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The Search for Ontological Emergence

Abstract: We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the… Show more

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Cited by 224 publications
(100 citation statements)
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“…Silberstein and McGeever (1999) argue that the maximally entangled state of two spatially separated EPR correlated particles is a paradigm case of strong emergence. Silberstein andMcGreever follow Humpreys (1997), Healy (1994), and Teller (1986) in suggesting that the appropriate ontology of entangled states is to regard the particle pairs as forming a spatially extended whole. It is then not so much that one particle influences the other, rather that with respect to certain properties there are no separate particles at all.…”
Section: The Fqhe and E3: Failure Of Mereological Superveniencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Silberstein and McGeever (1999) argue that the maximally entangled state of two spatially separated EPR correlated particles is a paradigm case of strong emergence. Silberstein andMcGreever follow Humpreys (1997), Healy (1994), and Teller (1986) in suggesting that the appropriate ontology of entangled states is to regard the particle pairs as forming a spatially extended whole. It is then not so much that one particle influences the other, rather that with respect to certain properties there are no separate particles at all.…”
Section: The Fqhe and E3: Failure Of Mereological Superveniencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, while arguments of 'inaccessibility' have already been formulated in physics (Silberstein & McGeever, 1999), this is not the case in biology 26 The third strategy is heuristic. There are in fact many cases, especially in complex systems, in which the available description of the configurational properties is insufficient to adequately determine the behaviour of the whole system.…”
Section: Why We Might Need After All Nested Causation In Biologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The different levels, in fact, are not built on one another, but rather all of them depend primarily on the observer's operations. Secondly, the classical distinction between an ontological kind of emergence, which relies on the properties of an objective reality, and an epistemological one, which depends on the limits of the observer (Silberstein and McGeever 1999), loses its meaning inside this framework. In fact we are dealing here with relations between descriptions.…”
Section: Relatednessmentioning
confidence: 99%