We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems to offer one, in the Bell properties of entangled particles, but other apparently promising candidates, such as non‐linear dynamical systems investigated by complexity studies and chaos theory, seem on careful analysis to display only epistemological emergence. We examine the consequences for physicalism of admitting ontological emergence in the micro‐physical.

We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal-environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Introduction. The philosophy of mind is over. The two main debates in the philosophy of mind over the last few decades about the essence of mental states (are they physical, functional, phenomenal, etc.) and over mental content have run their course. Positions have hardened; objections are repeated; theoretical filigrees are attached. These relatively armchair discussions are being replaced by empirically oriented debates in philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. We applaud this, and agree with Quine that "philosophy of science is philosophy enough" (1966). The purpose of this paper is first to provide a guide to philosophy of mind's successor debates in philosophy of cognitive science, and second to suggest resolutions for some obvious potential conflicts so as to avoid the scholastic pitfalls that plagued philosophy of mind. We will discuss two not quite distinct debates: the first over the spatial and temporal extent of the object of the psychological sciences; the second over the explanatory style of the cognitive and neural sciences. After describing the two debates and setting out the possible positions on them, we will discuss some interconnections between positions and then point to what we take to be some important issues for the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences in the next few years. 2. Debate #1: On Methodological Individualism. Ever since Putnam's declaration that meanings ain't in the head, there has been a vigorous debate over content externalism: is it possible to specify the content of mental states based purely on facts about the brain of the thinker, or must one also take into account features of the thinker's current or past environment? More recently, however this debate has shifted to one over whether the vehicle or content-bearer is confined to the brain of the thinker. The modern incarnation of this debate stemmed from work in connectionist networks by Rumelhart et al 1986. The suggestion there was that the pattern-completing brain was only a proper part of the cognitive system, the rest of which was external to the thinker's body. Rumelhart et al's example was solving mathematical problems on a chalkboard. In such a case, it was argued that the cognitive system included the brain, the chalkboard and the act of writing on the ...

Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to either stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail or acknowledge that there are counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences.

The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain-body-niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances. In this article we focus on two of these. First, the fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche makes it possible to explain extended cognition without invoking representations or computation. Second, cognition and conscious experience can be understood as a single phenomenon, eliminating fruitless philosophical discussion of qualia and the so-called hard problem of consciousness. What we call ''extended phenomenological-cognitive systems'' are relational and dynamical entities, with interactions among heterogeneous parts at multiple spatial and temporal scales.

To answer Wheeler's question "Why the quantum?" via quantum information theory according to Bub, one must explain both why the world is quantum rather than classical and why the world is quantum rather than superquantum, i.e., "Why the Tsirelson bound?" We show that the quantum correlations and quantum states corresponding to the Bell basis states, which uniquely produce the Tsirelson bound for the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt quantity, can be derived from conservation per no preferred reference frame (NPRF). A reference frame in this context is defined by a measurement configuration, just as with the light postulate of special relativity. We therefore argue that the Tsirelson bound is ultimately based on NPRF just as the postulates of special relativity. This constraint-based/principle answer to Bub's question addresses Fuchs' desideratum that we "take the structure of quantum theory and change it from this very overt mathematical speak ... into something like [special relativity]." Thus, the answer to Bub's question per Fuchs' desideratum is, "the Tsirelson bound obtains due to conservation per NPRF."