Complexity and Extended Phenomenological‐Cognitive Systems

Abstract

The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain-body-niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances. In this article we focus on two of these. First, the fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche makes it possible to explain extended cognition without invoking representations or computation. Second, cognition and conscious experience can be understood as a single phenomenon, eliminating fruitless philosophical discussion of qualia and the so-called hard problem of consciousness. What we call ''extended phenomenological-cognitive systems'' are relational and dynamical entities, with interactions among heterogeneous parts at multiple spatial and temporal scales.

There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience

“…Phenomenological conservatives (e.g., Peter Carruthers 2005, Michael Tye 1995) maintain that not all our mental states have (their own) phenomenal/qualitative components, e.g., cognitive and higher-level perceptual states. And perhaps less contentiously, Galen Strawson (2010) argues that in certain meditative moments (fortuitous or developing out of a disciplined meditative practice), one 26 As suggested by both this comparison and Bayne's astute description of entity (creature) SIL consciousness as involving "regions in a complex state-space," SIL consciousness might well be best thought of along the lines of complex dynamical systems theory (Varela 1995;Freeman 2000;Thompson et al 2005;Silberstein and Chemero 2012;Olivares et al 2015). One of the more compelling aspects of such approaches is how complex dynamical systems theory captures dynamical features of both the third person brain/body system and first-person phenomenological experience.…”

Experience in Design and Learning Approaches – Enhancing the Framework for Experience

“…Bernstein (1961, p. 6) added that experiencing qualities is not a sufficient condition for knowledge, but it is necessary. With regard to the second point, it could be claimed that the next point provides a view of the embodiment and extended phenomenological-cognitive system (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009;Telkänranta, 2015 andSilberstein &Chemero 2012) of quality. Dewey embeds qualities in the context, that is, he sees qualities as belonging to a situation.…”

Predictive brains and embodied, enactive cognition: an introduction to the special issue

“…As Silberstein and Chemero put it: "if the animal-environment system is just one system, the animal portion of the system need not represent the environment portion of the system to maintain its connection with it." (2012, p. 40) Silberstein and Chemero (2012) are not alone. Further bolstering this view is the idea that minds are not primarily for thinking, traditionally conceived, but for action (Hutto and Myin 2013).…”