The story must begin in the interwar years. Much, indeed, depends on an evaluation of the preparedness of Britain, the Commonwealth and its armies during this period. The balance drawn between 'structure', what seems likely given underlying trends, and 'contingency', 'those unpredicted and unpredictable historical accidents that can still have profound consequences', drives much of our understanding of the past. 1 It can also inform the manner in which preparations are made for the future. It is important, in short, to understand those areas where the British and Commonwealth Armies were in decline in the interwar years and recognise where, quite frankly, they were not. 2 The extent of British and Commonwealth military power during these critical years was a reflection first and foremost of Britain's economic, geopolitical and demographic strengths. Britain provided the vast majority of the funding for the interwar British and Commonwealth Armies and just about all of their equipment. For example, in the financial year 1937/8, Britain spent £265.2 million on defence, while India spent £34.5 million, Canada £7.2 million, Australia £6 million, South Africa £1.7 million and New Zealand £1.6 million. 3 The UK provided '90% of imperial munitions to the end of 1940, a proportion that remained above 60% even after the USA entered the war'. 4