The Self and the Phenomenal

Dainton, Barry

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00261.x

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Models and conceptions of the self are diverse. It is considered a substance or a thing, a concept, a narrative, a system, a process or a function; some even argue that there is no such thing as the self ( Hume, 1739 ; James, 1890 ; Dennett, 1992 ; Hayward, 1998 ; Tani, 1998 ; Perlis, 1999 ; Strawson, 1999 ; Dainton, 2004 ; Metzinger, 2004 ; Zahavi, 2008 ). This list is not exhaustive but it makes a point: there is no unifying concept of the self.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

2014

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This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

2014

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“…Exploiting a thought-experiment from Dainton (2004), I would venture a positive answer. As it happens, Dainton argues (2004, p. 370) that if we contemplate what it would be like to be "a point of pure apprehension, gazing outward, all senses keenly alert but detecting nothing," lacking also fringe feelings and thoughts, we realize that there would be nothing at all it would be like.…”

Section: The Need For Another Methodsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The phenomenologically manifest

Kriegel

2006

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call "the method of contrast" and "the method of knowability."

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“…There are many less popularized models as well, such as Bamford and Danaher's social identity [Bamford & Danaher 2017]. The existing model closest to the stream of consciousness model underlying the general description is phenomenal identity, in which identity is indicated by diachronic streams of experience [Dainton 2004]. Careful analysis of most of these models shows them to be rather poor models of metaphysical personal identity.…”

Section: Stream Of Consciousness Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness

Wiley

2023

Preprint

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A common interpretation of wakeful, nondestructive mind uploading is that the person with the postoperative original body exclusively persists the preoperative identity and that the person with the upload's body is some sort of identity copy. A frequent argument supporting this claim is that the preoperative person's stream of consciousness attaches exclusively to the postoperative person with the original body. By implication, the person with the upload's body spawns a new stream of consciousness, implying copy identity status. I argue that this is not the best metaphysical model of what happens in nondestructive uploading in the context of a stream of consciousness interpretation, and defend an alternative model which has generally received little attention in the existing literature: the branching identity model.

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The Self and the Phenomenal

Cited by 12 publications

References 9 publications

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

The phenomenologically manifest

Nondestructive Mind Uploading and the Stream of Consciousness

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