2022
DOI: 10.1051/ro/2021181
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The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

Abstract: A Stackelberg game is used to study the service pricing and the strategic behavior of customers in an unreliable and totally unobservable M/M/1 queue under a reward-cost structure. At the first stage, the server manager, acting as a leader, chooses a service price and, at the second stage, a customer, arriving at the system and acting as a follower, chooses to join the system or an outside opportunity, knowing only the service price imposed by the server manager and the system parameters. We show that the cons… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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References 36 publications
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“…However, it is essential to recognize that pricing strategies are not always fair to consumers [263]. In some cases, businesses use complex pricing models that take advantage of information asymmetry to charge higher prices than necessary.…”
Section: Service Pricingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it is essential to recognize that pricing strategies are not always fair to consumers [263]. In some cases, businesses use complex pricing models that take advantage of information asymmetry to charge higher prices than necessary.…”
Section: Service Pricingmentioning
confidence: 99%