The Snapshot Conception of Temporal Experiences

Chuard, Philippe

doi:10.4324/9781315269641-10

Cited by 25 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…They extend over temporally continuous intervals. Experience, contrary to what some authors have argued (Chuard, 2011), does not merely present us with how the world is at a moment, but rather, our perceptual processes represent the world as it is over a temporally extended interval (Grush, 2005;Lee, 2014;Phillips, 2010). 13 Hern andez (2020) argues that emotions are diachronic phenomena, but they also admit that they possess synchronic unity as well.…”

Section: Diachronic Unitymentioning

confidence: 83%

Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology

Goffin,

Viera

2023

Mind & Language

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According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal‐temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal‐causal order of the world.

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Section: Diachronic Unitymentioning

confidence: 83%

Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology

Goffin,

Viera

2023

Mind & Language

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“…On the anti-realist side, the defenders of the cinematic view argue that perceptual contents are instantaneous, but insufficient per se to deliver the phenomenology of change (cf. Chuard's 2011).…”

Section: Narrow Temporal Distributionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flow and presentness in experience

Torrengo

Cassaghi

2022

Philosophical Books

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In the contemporary landscape about temporal experience, debates concerning the "hard question" of the experience of the flow-as opposed to debates concerning more qualitative aspects of temporality, such as change, movement, succession and duration-are gaining more and more attention. The overall dialectics can be thought of in terms of a debate between the realists (who take the phenomenology of the flow of time seriously, and propose various account of it) and deflationists (who take our description of temporal phenomenology as "flowy" to be spurious, and propose various explanation of this spuriousness). In this paper we look inside the realist side. We distinguish primitivist realism, according to which the feeling of time flowing is an irreducible sui generis phenomenology, and various forms of reductionist realism, according to which the experience of the flow is ultimately explainable in terms of a more basic phenomenology. We present reasons to be sceptical against the various reductionist proposals.The conclusion is thus disjunctive: either primitivism or deflationism is the correct account of the purported experience of the flow of time.

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“…Chuard (, ) also independently develops a snapshot model of temporal experience. On one (perhaps uncharitable) reading of Chuard's proposal it falls foul of the Stern‐inspired line of argument; on another (perhaps more charitable) reading of Chuard's proposal, it shares the relevant features with the views of Arstila and Prosser.…”

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confidence: 99%

Minima sensibilia: Against the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience

Shardlow

2019

European J of Philosophy

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In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal phenomena—such as continuous motion and change—appears to be ubiquitous. How is it that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which combine together—in a sense which would need to be specified—to give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. Several authors have recently proposed dynamic snapshot models of temporal experience—such as Prosser and Arstila, building upon Le Poidevin—according to which, perceptual experience has no temporal content of a non‐zero extent. I argue that there is an absence of motivation for such a view; I develop and defend the claim that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non‐zero temporal extent as such.

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The Snapshot Conception of Temporal Experiences

Cited by 25 publications

References 1 publication

Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology

Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology

Flow and presentness in experience

Minima sensibilia: Against the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience

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