Since the financial crisis of 2008–9, how a state can play a more active role in correcting market failure has become a central topic in political economy. Thus, academia is again discussing state capitalism seriously. Contemporary state capitalism assumes state intervention in markets is becoming more multifaceted. Consequently, traditional state-owned enterprises exist alongside new government-favored actors, such as privately owned national champions and sovereign wealth funds, intervening in markets. This coalition helps the state achieve its security, political, economic, social, and nationalistic goals more efficiently. Its growing power in markets also heralds the return of state capitalism. This paper uses state capitalism theories to re-interpret China's food security governance. The three preliminary findings are as follows. First, China's food security governance is typically operated under state capitalism, which has successfully managed China's foodavailability, though not without some corruption, but has weakened its foodaccessibility. Second, using state capitalism to manage China's foodsafetyhas been impeded, so the effects remain to be seen. Third, state capitalism has successfully improved thestabilityof the food supply and demand in China, but its agricultural business branching-out strategy has worried the international community and should be observed further.