The Socratic Theory of Motivation

Do Explanatory Desire Attributions Generate Opaque Contexts?

“…Theoretically, I can agree that human behavior is motivated by a single desire, the desire for happiness. I believe (Reshotko 1990(Reshotko , 1992) that happiness itself is an objective state and is independent of how it appears to the individual. This said, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the subject's desire for happiness should also be taken de re.…”

“…My claim is that, when one considers the objective relationship between Charles' overarching desire (to get home as quickly as possible) and the situation at hand, a natural primacy is assigned to the the Gorgius terminology is somewhat clumsy, especially in the absence of an exegetical treatment of that passage. This distinction is clarified using the Soeratic terminology in Penner 1990, 1994and Reshotko 1992. I am merely (as Penner has suggested in many conversations over the years) employing terminology that matches Socrates' discussion of true and false pleasures in Plato's Philebus (36cff.)…”

“…I am arguing for an epistemic thesis about how we should understand the reference of the terms that we use in any hypothesized explanation for purposive behavior where we hope to confirm or negate this explanatory hypothesis through observation. This thesis is derived from the metaphysical thesis that agents are unlikely to know what they desire and therefore it is not fruitful to consider the object of the agent's desire to be simply whatever he or she believes it to be (Reshotko, 1990 and1992;Penner and Rowe, 1994). I believe that the object of a desire can only (although, even then, not always) be reached through a de re characterization.…”

Reasoning with the Irrational

“…Recently, Devereux1995, and following him, Brickhouse and Smith 2000, 179-181 and 2002and 2005, have also argued that Socrates posits the existence of irrational desires in the Protagoras. These commentators have not, however, given a clear and explicit account of the nature of an irrational desire, but have 2 See, e.g., Frede 1992, xxix-xxx;Irwin 1977, 78, and1995, 209;Penner 1990Penner , 1996Penner , 1997Reshotko 1992. 3 Irwin 1995Penner 1971Penner , 1990and Reeve 1988, 134-135 also argue that the moral psychology of the Republic differs from that of the Protagoras in so far as the Republic acknowledges the existence of irrational desires.…”