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A bstract Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co-referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non-psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be read de re.

IntroductionThe Socratic theory of the good, the bad, and the neither good nor bad (NGNB), as described in the Euthydemus and the Gorgias, is a central tenet which determines much of the rest of Socratic Ethics. However, Socrates' discussion of the good, bad, and NGNB in the Lysis has confused and frustrated several scholars, as it seems to distort, rather than to clarify, what Socrates says concerning good and bad elsewhere.' In the Lysis, Socrates uses examples that do not distinguish between (1) the claim that the good is sought for itself, and (2) the claim that the good is sought so that something that was NGNB, but has been tainted by the bad, may return to the NGNB. In this paper, I argue t h a t this confusion arises because Socrates is mixing two different relative scales that make use of the terms "good," "bad," and "NGNB" in these examples, and t h a t the difficulties can be resolved once these scales are distinguished from one another. The Neither Good Nor Bad in the Gorgias and EuthydemusAt least three separate times in the Early Dialogues, Plato has Socrates divide those things desired by humans into the good, the bad, and the neither good nor bad, in order to elucidate a hierarchy among objects of desire. At Gorgias 467e-468d, the division and hierarchy are elucidated clearly. Bad things are neither desirable in themselves nor as a means for obtaining something beyond them. NGNB things a r e ambivalent-they are actually2 good if used as a means for N a o m i Reshotko i s Associate Professor o f Philosophy a t t h e University of Denver. S h e has published articles o n Socratic ethics and psychology and on Pluto's metaphysics.