Virtue as the Only Unconditional — But not Intrinsic — Good

Reshotko, Naomi

doi:10.5840/ancientphil200121248

Cited by 24 publications

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“…The second observation concerns the possibility that an affirmation about a fact that gives us reason to act in a certain way is made without adequate specification of the circumstances in which this fact gives us this reason. As Scanlon (2014, p. 32) himself already noticed, our affirmations about our reasons for acting are often vague in this respect, and it would be a mistake to hold that just because they are vague in this way they are not actually claims about 10 On this point, see f. ex Hackforth (1945, p. 106), Taylor (1956, p. 80), Gosling & Taylor (1982, p. 152-154), Ferejohn (1984, p. 109-115), Vlastos (1985a, p. 13-14), Reeve (1989, p. 130-136), Annas (1993, p. 57), Brickhouse & Smith (1994, p. 106, n. 8), Irwin (1995, p. 55-56), Carone (2000, p. 265), Reshotko (2001), Evans (2008, p. 125, n. 10), Carpenter (2011), Rider (2012a, p. 2, 13), Rider (2012b, p. 208, 222-226), Aufderheide (2013), Adams (2014) and Fletcher (2014, p. 115). reasons for acting.…”

Section: The Weighing Model Of Practical Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Nascimento

2020

Rev. Archai

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This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue (PSV). It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons (2014), and then I adapt these concepts so as to render them apt to be used in the formulation I intend to offer. In the third section I present my formulation of the PSV using the concepts introduced in the second section and explain why I believe this formulation is better than the one offered by Vlastos.

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Section: The Weighing Model Of Practical Deliberationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Nascimento

2020

Rev. Archai

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“…7 Precisely how these goods should be regarded is controversial. For recent discussion, see Reshotko (2001); ; Price (2011). 8 The view put forward in the Euthydemus concerning the nature of goods like health and wealth seems to anticipate Stoic views concerning so-called "indifferents" (cf.…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Precisely how these goods should be regarded is controversial. For recent discussion, see Reshotko (); Russell (); Price ().…”

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Platonic know‐how and successful action

Nawar

2017

European J of Philosophy

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In Plato's Euthydemus, Socrates claims that the possession of epistēmē (usually construed as knowledge or understanding) suffices for practical success. Several recent treatments suggest that we may make sense of this claim and render it plausible by drawing a distinction between so-called "outcome-success" and "internal-success" and supposing that epistēmē only guarantees internal-success. In this paper, I raise several objections to such treatments and suggest that the relevant cognitive state should be construed along less than purely intellectual lines: as a cognitive state constituted at least in part by ability. I argue that we may better explain Socrates' claims that epistēmē suffices for successful action by attending to the nature of abilities, what it is that we attempt to do when acting, and what successful action amounts to in the relevant contexts.These considerations suggest that, contrary to several recent treatments, the success in question is not always internal-success. | INTRODUCTIONWhat is the relation between knowledge and successful action? And what do we aim at in action and what makes for a successful action? This paper aims to make sense of the answers to these question put forward in Plato's Euthydemus where Socrates seems to claim that a certain sort of cognitive state is sufficient for some sort of practical success. My discussion is not, however, exclusively restricted to the Euthydemus, or indeed Plato (Aristotle and Ryle make prominent appearances). Neither is it exclusively historical as it is concerned at least in part with the nature of knowledge-how and abilities, the nature of practical success, and what precisely we attempt or aim at in action.Early on in the Euthydemus, Socrates offers an exhortation to a life of virtue and philosophy. Assuming that all people wish to do well (eu prattein, Euthydemus 278e3), Socrates wonders how we do well (279a1-2). In what follows, he considers the relation between good fortune, successful action, and various crafts (or kinds of know-how) and claims that flute players have good fortune (eutuchia) when it comes to success or doing well (eupragia) in flute music (279e1-2), and that something similar applies to knowing how to write (279e2-4) and various other kinds of knowledge. Socrates goes on to also claim that wisdom (sophia) does not require luck in order to succeed (280a6-b3) and that "knowledge (epistēmē) seems to provide men not only with good fortune (eutuchia) but also with success or doing well (eupragia) in every case of possession or action" (281b2-4).This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

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Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life

Russell

2005

132

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This book examines Plato's subtle and insightful analysis of pleasure and explores its intimate connections with his discussions of value and human psychology. The book offers a fresh perspective on how good things bear on happiness in Plato's ethics, and shows that for Plato, pleasure cannot determine happiness because pleasure lacks a direction of its own. Plato presents wisdom as a skill of living that determines happiness by directing one's life as a whole, bringing about goodness in all areas of one's life, as a skill brings about order in its materials. The ‘materials’ of the skill of living are, in the first instance, not things like money or health, but one's attitudes, emotions, and desires where things like money and health are concerned. Plato recognizes that these ‘materials’ of the psyche are inchoate, ethically speaking, and in need of direction from wisdom. Among them is pleasure, which Plato treats not as a sensation but as an attitude with which one ascribes value to its object. However, Plato also views pleasure, once shaped and directed by wisdom, as a crucial part of a virtuous character as a whole. Consequently, Plato rejects all forms of hedonism, which allows happiness to be determined by a part of the psyche that does not direct one's life but is among the materials to be directed. At the same time, Plato is also able to hold both that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and that pleasure is necessary for happiness, not as an addition to one's virtue, but as a constituent of one's whole virtuous character itself. Plato therefore offers an illuminating role for pleasure in ethics and psychology, one to which we may be unaccustomed: pleasure emerges not as a sensation or even a mode of activity, but as an attitude — one of the ways in which we construe our world — and as such, a central part of every character.

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Virtue as the Only Unconditional — But not Intrinsic — Good

Cited by 24 publications

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Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue

Platonic know‐how and successful action

Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life

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