2018
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818318000176
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The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order

Abstract: How does publicizing states' illicit activities affect the stability of international order? What does this relationship tell us about how governments react to violations of international rules? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that transparent monitoring strengthens the normative legal order, we argue that these activities often undermine it. We develop two mechanisms through which this occurs: by raising the known rate of noncompliance, and by sharpening the threat that deviance poses to other states. … Show more

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Cited by 44 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 68 publications
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“…Alternatively, states may fear that exposing deviant behavior of adversaries will normalize transgressions in ways that undermine international regimes (Carnegie and Carson 2019). Exposing information about rivals can also trigger destabilizing security competition, both by provoking other states to respond to a rival’s behavior and by fueling domestic pressures for more confrontational policies among hawkish elites and the general public (Carnegie and Carson 2018; Carson 2018).…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Alternatively, states may fear that exposing deviant behavior of adversaries will normalize transgressions in ways that undermine international regimes (Carnegie and Carson 2019). Exposing information about rivals can also trigger destabilizing security competition, both by provoking other states to respond to a rival’s behavior and by fueling domestic pressures for more confrontational policies among hawkish elites and the general public (Carnegie and Carson 2018; Carson 2018).…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In some cases, keeping information secret minimizes scrutiny of norm-violating behavior or circumvents political pressure to take action in situations that leaders would rather avoid (McManus and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Carson and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Carson 2018). In other cases, states may choose to disclose information in ways that serve their interests, either through public announcements or selective disclosure to international monitoring agencies (Carnegie and Carson 2018, 2019).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…IIGOs also bypass transparency requirements that have become standard with FIGOs (Grigorescu, 2003), which promotes frank discussions and information-sharing because states typically do not have to record formal votes or leave paper trails. The large number of security-related IIGOs also challenges arguments that FIGOs ‘with strong institutional capabilities to share information’ are uniquely well suited to keeping clandestine information (Carnegie & Carson, 2018).
Figure 3. Age of IIGOs
Instead, the predominance of nuclear-related IIGOs shows that in high security settings, states guard their sovereignty not by delegating to a strong FIGO secretariat, but by using an IIGO to maintain secrecy.…”
Section: Iigos Are For ‘High’ Politics 12mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…New agendas for studying diplomacy have recently arisen in the area of security studies (e.g., Carnegie and Carson 2018;Carson 2016;Lebovic and Saunders 2016;Trager 2010Trager , 2017Holmes 2013;Potter 2016), but they are far less common in the study of international economic relations. There are, however, a few prominent exceptions.…”
Section: Dispute Settlement In International Tradementioning
confidence: 99%