The stability of exchange networks

Abstract

Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Doğan, G., Assen, M. V., Rijt, A. V. D., & Buskens, V. W. (2009). The stability of exchange networks. Social Networks, 31(2), 118-125. DOI: 10.1016118-125. DOI: 10. /j.socnet.2008 Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum. b s t r a c tEconomic and sociological exchange theories predict divisions of exchange benefits given an assumed fixed network of exchange relations. Since network structure has been found to have a large impact on actors' payoffs, actors have strong incentives for network change. We answer the question what happens to both the network structure and actor payoffs when myopic actors change their links in order to maximize their payoffs. We investigate the networks that are stable, the networks that are efficient or egalitarian with varying tie costs, and the occurrence of social dilemmas. Only few networks are stable over a wide range of tie costs, and all of them can be divided into two types: efficient networks consisting of only dyads and at most one isolate, and Pareto efficient and egalitarian cycles with an odd number of actors. Social dilemmas are observed in even-sized networks at low tie costs.

Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree

“…Second, in a repeated setting we could also make the network dynamic, letting individuals choose their network connections based on what they have learned from previous play. Natural questions are then which network structures are stable, and to what extent these networks are efficient and satisfy equity (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996;Dogan et al, 2009). A third main direction in which the current model could be extended concerns the information individuals have about the network.…”

Social Network Analysis: Foundations and Frontiers on Advantage

“…In theory, they should not. Theoretical models describe how advantage should be distributed in stable "equilibrium" networks (Buskens & van de Rijt 2008, Dogan et al 2009, Goyal & Vega-Redondo 2007, Kleinberg et al 2008, Reagans & Zuckerman 2008, Ryall & Sorenson 2007. The models imply pessimistic conclusions about the feasibility of stable access to structural holes, though people seem able to muddle through (Burger & Buskens 2009), and the people who have advantaged access to holes today are often the people who had network advantage yesterday.…”

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Reciprocity, Negotiation, and the Choice of Structurally Disadvantaged Actors to Remain in Networks

“…Thus, we add to the literature on network dynamics by uncovering how one’s exchange history informs how people respond psychologically to the exit opportunity. Past theorizing and research on the stability of exchange networks considers how uncertainty and the desire to accumulate resources informs the addition and deletion of particular linkages between actors in a network (e.g., Dogan et al 2009; Emerson 1972; Kollock 1994; Willer and Willer 2000). Our research is different in that it examines situations where disadvantaged people choose to extract themselves from whole networks rather than particular exchange relations, and it explores how the form of exchange affects this choice through the psychological process of group formation.…”

“…The stability of network exchange structures that privilege some and disadvantage others is the subject of much theorizing and research (e.g., Cook and Gillmore 1984; Dogan et al 2009; Leik 1992; Rand, Arbesman, and Christakis 2011; Willer and Willer 2000). This scholarship often builds on Emerson’s (1972) idea that power imbalanced networks should move toward equality as disadvantaged actors attempt to improve their situation by either altering their or their exchange partner’s values or changing the structural conditions of the network.…”