Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree

Abstract

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Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

“…After having thus transformed the payoffs, individuals are assumed to choose their strategies rationally. There is experimental support for the claim that experimental subjects evaluate mutual cooperation as more desirable than successful cheating (Kiyonari et al, 2000;Rilling et al, 2002), and the model we present in this article is an elaboration of this notion (see also Dijkstra & van Assen, 2013).…”

“…Third, we consider extending our theoretical analyses to more players, including N-person games and network games. For instance, Dijkstra and van Assen (2013), using the same model of players' preferences, show that cooperation is more frequent in dense groups or networks satisfying a condition called degree independence. We aim to analyze repeated N-person and network games, to examine how cooperation may evolve in these repeated games under our model assumptions, depending on network structure, number of repetitions, and the structure of the game (simultaneous or sequential).…”

“…Player j will cooperate if and only if given y i the expected payoffs of cooperation are at least as large as the expected payoffs of defecting. Dijkstra and Van Assen (2013) prove that this condition gives the result that under each BNE and for each player there is a threshold θ Ã j ¼ 1Àa y i such that players j with θ j , θ Ã j defect and others cooperate with y i ¼ 1 À Pðθ Ã i Þ, and…”

“…To illustrate the nature of the assurance problem and efficiency of the game with and without complete information, consider Example 1 from Dijkstra and van Assen (2013). Whereas efficiency in Example 1 is still higher under complete than incomplete information, later on we will slightly modify it to Example 2 where efficiency is highest under incomplete information.…”

Analysis and control of strategic interactions in finite heterogeneous populations under best-response update rule

“…While these assumptions help to simplify the mathematical setup and gain insight into the theoretical aspects of cooperation mechanisms, an interesting research line that has not been explored to its full potential is to study a finite heterogeneous population of game-playing agents under stochastic discrete-time updating dynamics. [7] Interesting simulation results have been conducted for heterogeneous populations in [11], [12] and [13] where the agents are associated with different payoff matrices. Some mathematical statements have been provided in [14] and [15] The work was supported in part by the European Research Council (ERCStG-307207).…”