The Strategic Development of Border Areas: Explaining Variation in Interaction Opportunity Across Land Borders

Aleprete, Michael E.; Hoffman, Aaron M.

doi:10.1080/03050629.2012.640207

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…It is important to emphasize that leaders are strategic in their consolidation of border regions and have incentive to work particularly hard to integrate areas that are at high risk for claims. Thus, our argument implies that leaders will focus on border regions where portions of the population continue to coordinate behavior along historical precedents rather than the current boundary (Aleprete Jr. and Hoffman 2012; Carter 2010). This is especially true in Europe starting the early 19th century, as a heightened need for a steady stream of taxes, conscripts and materials pushed states to implement more direct rule over their citizens and control over their territories (Dincecco 2011; Dincecco, Federico, and Vindigni 2011; Hoffman and Rosenthal 1997; Karaman and Pamuk 2013; Tilly 1992, 114–126).…”

Section: Old Borders and Territorial Claimsmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes

Abramson

Carter

2016

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Given the abundance of evidence that disputed territory matters, we know remarkably little about the origins of territorial claims. We argue that the presence of competing historical border precedents is central to the emergence of territorial claims. We outline why precedents provide opportunity to make claims and provide two possible explanations for why leaders have incentive to claim along precedents. One possibility is consistent with the conventional wisdom that incentive derives from territorial characteristics such as natural resources or strategic significance. A second and more novel explanation is that the persistent coordination effects of historical boundaries provide the incentive to draw claims along them. We use new data on the location of historical boundaries from the peace of Westphalia until the start of the French Revolution to show that historical border precedents drive the emergence of territorial claims after the Congress of Vienna and that persistent coordination effects provide incentive to dispute historical precedents.

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Section: Old Borders and Territorial Claimsmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes

Abramson

Carter

2016

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…The literature on interstate conflict has long recognized that conflicts cluster in geographic space (Aleprete and Hoffman 2012;Braithwaite 2006;Enterline 1998;Gleditsch 1995;Lemke 1995;Starr 1980, 1989;O'Laughlin 1987;Siverson and Starr 1990;Starr 2002;Starr and Most 1976;Starr and Thomas 2005;Vasquez 1995). However, our theoretical focus and empirical analysis focuses on the ability of states to project power past shared borders and regional neighborhoods.…”

Section: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power

Markowitz

Fariss

2013

International Interactions

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Do Walls Work? The Effectiveness of Border Barriers in Containing the Cross-Border Spread of Violent Militancy

Linebarger

Braithwaite

2020

International Studies Quarterly

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Since the end of the Cold War, walls, fences, and fortifications have been constructed on interstate borders at a rapid rate. It remains unclear, however, whether these fortifications provide effective security. We explore whether border fortifications provide security against the international spread of violent militancy. Although barriers can reduce the likelihood that militant activity diffuses across international borders, their effectiveness is conditional upon the roughness of the terrain on which they are built and the level of infrastructure development in their proximity. Barriers require intensive manpower to monitor and patrol, and so conditions like rough terrain and poor infrastructure render security activity more difficult. However, rebels and other militants prefer to operate in such difficult areas, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of barriers in containing the international spread of violent militancy. Analyses on newly collated data on interstate border fortifications within a global sample of contiguous-state directed-dyad-years show that border fortifications are only effective in limiting the diffusion of militancy in contexts in which states can plausibly monitor and police their borders. This paper has significant implications for the academic literatures on national security and intrastate conflict, and it also speaks to the broader policy debate over border walls and fences.

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The Strategic Development of Border Areas: Explaining Variation in Interaction Opportunity Across Land Borders

Cited by 6 publications

References 37 publications

The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes

The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes

Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power

Do Walls Work? The Effectiveness of Border Barriers in Containing the Cross-Border Spread of Violent Militancy

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