The strategy method lowers measured trustworthy behavior

Abstract

In a trust game experiment, we elicited choices using either the so-called game or strategy method. While the two methods yield similar rates of trust, the strategy method reveals a significantly lower rate of trustworthiness.Keywords: Trust; game method; laboratory; experiments; reciprocity JEL Classification: C90 IntroductionExperimental economists are increasingly using the strategy method for eliciting choices in laboratory and field experiments. Following this method, first subjects state contingent choices for every decision node they may face; then subjects are matched; and, finally, the appropriate choices are carried out for the nodes that are reached, and the other contingent choices are ignored. This contrasts with the more natural game method, in which subjects are first matched; then subjects learn when specific decision nodes are reached; and they make a single choice only for realized nodes.While from a game-theoretic perspective these elicitation methods should not affect behavior, in this paper we show that the two methods yield different behavior in a simplified trust game. Compared to the game method, in the strategy method the fraction of completely selfish subjects who act in an untrustworthy manner increases by 50 percent, and the fraction of egalitarian equal splits of the surplus falls by two-thirds.Researchers find the strategy method useful for several reasons. First, it allows the researcher to observe behavior at rarely-reached decision nodes. Second, it is convenient for use *

Testosterone administration does not affect men's rejections of low ultimatum game offers or aggressive mood

“…Firstly, subjects stated their full strategies both as proposers and as responders at the start of the game and before roles were assigned. Previous studies suggest that this method of elicitation (called the strategy method) and role uncertainty can have a large impact on behavior (Casari and Cason, 2009;Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2010). Therefore, one cannot rule out that the potential effects of T might dissipate when the ultimatum game is played in this more indirect form, where subjects are invited to consider both roles in the game and specify responses to hypothetical offers.…”

Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

“…16 A table with all possible combinations of payoffs was shown to the group: each combination was explained to the participants using the word reduce instead of the word punish. 17 The effect of the choice methodology used on subjects' behavior varies across studies (Brandts and Charness, 2000;Casari and Cason, 2009;Oxoby and McLeish, 2004). Roth (1985) discusses the behavioral reasons behind such differences.…”

“…The decision to use the strategy method was influenced mainly by the desire to make the methodology comparable to that used in laboratory third-party punishment experiments (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000), and by logistical considerations which made the application of the direct-response method in a field setting extremely challenging (Casari and Cason, 2009). The strategy method, while having the advantage of allowing higher statistical depth in the analysis of punishers' decisions, especially at the nodes that are rarely reached in sequential play, may affect behavior relative to the direct-response method.…”

Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity

“…Every trustee made the choice without knowing the choice made by the trustor. Casari and Cason (2009) show that trustees give less to trustors when they do not know the choice made by the trustor. This should make it difficult for us to find differences in the choices of trustees and dictators.…”