The Structure And Dynamics Of Eu Federalism

Abstract

This article analyzes European Union (EU) politics through the lens of comparative federalism. The article assesses the contributions that rationalist and constructivist approaches can make to the analysis of EU federalism, focusing on two broad questions. First, what explains shifts in authority from the state (i.e., member states) to the federal (i.e., EU) level? Second, what explains the degree to which the federal government constrains state discretion? This article develops testable hypotheses based on the rationalist and constructivist perspectives and presents a set of initial plausibility probes. The article shows that there is considerable room for dialogue between rationalist and constructivist perspectives and together they can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the dynamics of EU federalism.

Explaining Task Allocation in the EU: ‘Retooling’ Federalism for Comparative Analysis

“…In sum, these three theories do not completely explain the shifting parameters of the task allocation discussion through time and the continual (re-)construction of the issue by different actors with (at least in relation to the Commission and the Unite Kingdom) changing interests. While the existence and significance of transboundary spillovers and jurisdictional mismatch were certainly intensively debated and hence in theory are amenable to federal explanations, the deeply constructed nature of task allocation cannot readily be understood in these terms, somewhat contradicting Kelemen's (2003) arguments that rational accounts can explain how actors with clear preferences employ opportunities within federal institutional structures to shift authority upwards. This conclusion reflects broader concerns within EU studies that many 'prevailing theories of European integration [.…”

“…The relationship between social constructivist and federal pieces in the overall mosaic is therefore intriguing, but to date has not been widely explored. One author that has taken up this challenge is Kelemen (). He has examined shifts in authority between Member States and the EU, where there is evidently ‘considerable room for dialogue between rationalist and constructivist perspectives and together they can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the dynamics of EU federalism’ (Kelemen, , p. 184).…”

“…One author that has taken up this challenge is Kelemen (). He has examined shifts in authority between Member States and the EU, where there is evidently ‘considerable room for dialogue between rationalist and constructivist perspectives and together they can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the dynamics of EU federalism’ (Kelemen, , p. 184). He identifies some initial hypotheses which he subjects to a plausibility probe, concluding the ‘possibility of a constructive theoretical dialogue’ (Kelemen, , p. 202).…”

The Federal Features of the EU: Lessons from Canada

“…Rather, because at the end of the day the EU needs to deal with multinationalism (as does Canada). 4 Furthermore, Canada is a much more 2 Examples of scholars who have described the EU this way see Kelemen (2003Kelemen ( , 2007, Hueglin (2013), Börzel and Hosli (2003), Börzel (2005), Kreppel (2006) and Verdun (2015a). Wood and Verdun (2011) have compared Canada and the EU, thereby implicitly examining the EU as a federal-like entity, see for their more recent studies: Verdun and Wood (2013).…”

Agent permeability, principal delegation and the European Court of Human Rights

“…While the existing literature on ICs is rich and sophisticated and marked by higher levels of agreement than once existed, important questions involving the interaction between states and ICs remain unanswered (Alter 1998;Burley and Mattli 1993;Cichowski 2004;Conant 2002;Garrett 1995;Garrett et al 1998;Kelemen 2003;Keohane et al 2000;Mattli and Slaughter 1998;Stone Sweet 2004;Weiler 1991). One such question concerns whether ICs can even be fruitfully compared to other IOs or whether they are fundamentally too different.…”