The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders

Holsti, Ole R.; Rosenau, James N.

doi:10.2307/2131421

Cited by 92 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Participants at the lowest education level, who at most graduated from high school, exhibited significantly more prejudice towards the Chinese people, and a greater desire to contain China than did those at higher education levels. Like Holsti and Rosenau [19], but unlike Conover and Sapiro [8], we did not find significant gender differences in our data, with the one minor exception mentioned above. Overall, our three China surveys align with Holsti and Rosenau's ( [19]: 116) broader argument, based on their Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) data from the late 1970s and early 1980s, that "party, ideology, and occupation are strongly and consistently associated with foreign policy attitudes, whereas gender, age, education, and military service are less so… Specifically, conservatives [and] Republicans… are significantly more likely to be hardliners… [than] liberals [and] Democrats."…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 46%

Political Orientation, Party Affiliation, and American Attitudes Towards China

Gries

Crowson

2010

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI

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Little is known about how the political orientations and party affiliations of ordinary Americans impact their perceptions of China. Based on our surveys, we find that partisanship does indeed impact American views of China. Self-reported "conservatives" perceive significantly greater threat in China's rise, hold more negative views of the Chinese government, exhibit more prejudice towards the Chinese people, and advocate a much tougher U.S. China policy than self-reported "liberals" do. Republicans perceive significantly greater threat from China and advocate tougher China policies than Democrats do, but party affiliation has a lesser impact on prejudice scores. Regression analyses reveals that education, gender, and age each has an impact on American views of China, but that impact is negligible compared to partisanship.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 46%

Political Orientation, Party Affiliation, and American Attitudes Towards China

Gries

Crowson

2010

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI

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“…The findings of these scholars demonstrate with remarkable consistency that support or opposition to the militant and cooperative dimensions is the central cleavage that structures American opinions of foreign policy (Wittkopf 1990, 34-36;Holsti 2004, 163-239;Holsti and Rosenau 1990), and these attitudes are a dominant correlate of specific policy opinions, including opinions of defense spending (Wittkopf 1990, 54).…”

Section: Support For Defense Spending At the Individual Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Acceptability of War and Support for Defense Spending: Evidence from Fourteen Democracies, 2004-2013

Eichenberg

Stoll

2014

SSRN Journal

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We study the factors that influence citizen support for defense spending in fourteen democracies over the period [2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013]. We pose two research questions: First, what factors influence citizen support for war and military force? We refer to this as the acceptability of war. Second, in addition to the acceptability of war, what other factors affect support for defense spending? Our principal finding is that citizen acceptance of war and support for defense spending are most influenced by basic beliefs and values. Gender also has a strong negative influence on attitudes toward war and thus indirectly lowers support for defense spending among women. Attitudes toward war and defense spending are also sometimes influenced by short-term threats and by alliance considerations, but the effects are not as substantively meaningful. We conclude with a summary of the results and a discussion of the implications for theory and policy. Authors note:We are grateful to the editors and to three anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the German Marshall Fund for providing access to their opinion surveys. A replication file including our dataset, Stata commands to replicate the analyses, and supplementary appendices are posted on the journal website together with this article.

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“…In comparison, the efficacy (.04), Northern Ireland (-.01) and ethnocentrism (-.15) parameters are weak and are not statistically significant. Many public opinion researchers connect these types of "domain beliefs to international relations theory -realism and idealism Peffley 1987, 1990;Holsti and Rosenau 1990;Wittkopf 1990Wittkopf , 1994Maggiotto 1991;Page and Shapiro 1992;Peffley and Hurwitz 1992;Russett, Hartley, and Murray 1994;Holsti 1996;Murray, Cowden and Russett 1999;Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999;Page and Barabas 2000)" (JenkinsSmith, 2004: 291). The relative strength of the independence and patriotism factors in the model confirms the importance of these two drivers in the maintenance of Irish neutrality and the theoretical relevance of the social constructivist framework that considers the identity factor in foreign policy analysis.…”

Section: Efficacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework

Devine

2008

International Political Science Review

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ABSTRACT. In a 2006 IPRS article, entitled Choosing to Go It Alone: Irish Neutrality in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, Neal G. Jesse argues that Irish neutrality is best understood through a neoliberal rather than a neorealist IR theory framework. This article posits an alternative 'critical social constructivist' framework of understanding of Irish neutrality. The first part of the article considers the differences between neoliberalism and social constructivism and argues why critical social constructivism's emphasis on beliefs, identity and the agency of the public in foreign policy are key factors explaining Irish neutrality today. Using public opinion data, the second part of the paper tests whether national identity, independence, ethnocentrism, attitudes to Northern Ireland and efficacy are factors driving public support for Irish neutrality. The results show that public attitudes to Irish neutrality are structured along the dimensions of independence and identity, indicating empirical support for a critical social constructivist framework understanding of Irish neutrality.

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The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders

Cited by 92 publications

References 16 publications

Political Orientation, Party Affiliation, and American Attitudes Towards China

Political Orientation, Party Affiliation, and American Attitudes Towards China

The Acceptability of War and Support for Defense Spending: Evidence from Fourteen Democracies, 2004-2013

Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework

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