The structure of (self-) consciousness

Smith, David

doi:10.1007/bf00139228

Cited by 143 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…According to self-representationalism, conscious states are those that are represented, not by higher-order thoughts or perception-like states, but simply by themselves (Smith, 1986;Caston, 2002;Kriegel, 2003a). Their being represented at all makes us aware of them, and their being represented by themselves, rather than by separate higher-order states, makes the awareness unmediated in a very straightforward sense.…”

Section: The Cross-order Integration Theory Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

Kriegel¹

2007

Consciousness and Cognition

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Section: The Cross-order Integration Theory Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

Kriegel¹

2007

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…8. For close interpretations of Brentano along these lines, see Smith (1986Smith ( , 1989, Zahavi (1998aZahavi ( , 1999, Thomasson (2000) and Kriegel (2003aKriegel ( , 2003b. 9.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12. See Smith (1986), Rosenthal (1986Rosenthal ( , 2002a, Lycan (1996), Carruthers (2000) and Levine (2001).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

Kriegel

2004

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

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Abstract:In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible for her to easily obtain as much information as she may need. The argument for this account of consciousness' functional role will proceed in three main stages. First, the phenomenological approach to consciousness as peripheral self-awareness will be expounded and endorsed. Second, an account of the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness will be offered. Finally, the account of the functional role of peripheral self-awareness will be obtained by straightforward extension from the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness.

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“…4, andSturma 1995). More recently, it has been defended by Smith (1986Smith ( , 1989, Thomasson (2000), Hossack (2002) and Caston (2002). It is impossible to review this literature here.…”

Section: Conclusion: a New Solution To Moore's Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief

Kriegel

2004

Erkenntnis

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ABSTRACT. Propositions such as are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore's paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently argued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first-and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker's own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core of the endorsed account is the claim that conscious beliefs are always partly about themselves; it will be shown to follow from this that conscious beliefs in Moorean propositions are self-contradictory.

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The structure of (self-) consciousness

Cited by 143 publications

References 13 publications

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief

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