2007
DOI: 10.1007/s11366-007-9008-0
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The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition Between China and Taiwan in Oceania

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Cited by 26 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…However, around one‐quarter of Taiwan's small number of diplomatic allies are located in the South Pacific. Consequently, China's and Taiwan's foreign policy in the region has been driven by their respective efforts to bring these Pacific island nations into the fold (Crocombe, 2007; Van Fossen, 2007). The resulting ‘chequebook diplomacy’ has had positive effects for the South Pacific nations in terms of short‐term economic gains, but has complicated democratic competition, led to corruption and social conflict and has been roundly criticised (Brady and Henderson, 2010).…”
Section: China's Relations In the Pacificmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, around one‐quarter of Taiwan's small number of diplomatic allies are located in the South Pacific. Consequently, China's and Taiwan's foreign policy in the region has been driven by their respective efforts to bring these Pacific island nations into the fold (Crocombe, 2007; Van Fossen, 2007). The resulting ‘chequebook diplomacy’ has had positive effects for the South Pacific nations in terms of short‐term economic gains, but has complicated democratic competition, led to corruption and social conflict and has been roundly criticised (Brady and Henderson, 2010).…”
Section: China's Relations In the Pacificmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although Nauru had been a long-time ally of Taiwan, the island state accepted the Chinese monetary assistance in return for recognising Beijing. Three years later, prompted by China's failure to come up with the pledged millions in aid and Taiwan's assistance in paying off a debt of US$13.5 million, Nauru switched its loyalty back to Taipei again (Su 2005;Van Fossen 2007). 15.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As the Kiribati politician quoted at the beginning of this article articulates (see also Corbett 2013), strategically adept Pacific SIS can derive benefits from IOs by leveraging aid, support from larger states like Russia, Taiwan, and China (Stringer 2006;Van Fossen 2007), and by voting in blocs (like the ACP). There are also substantial benefits associated with being classified as 'small' and 'developing' by IOs: membership of the UN Small Island Developing States network, for example, or access to the Commonwealth Secretariat's Small States Office.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Since Keohane (1969), the literature on small states in IOs either focuses on their relationships with larger states or 'great powers ' (e.g. Stringer 2006;Van Fossen 2007) or the capacity of their domestic bureaucracies (Jacobs 1975;Murray 1985;Bray 1992;Schahczenski 1992;ADB 1995). We take a different approach.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%