The Swazi Monarchy and the Poor Performance of the Swazi Anti-Corruption Agency, 2006–2009

Abstract

One of the major problems that has faced African countries since political independence has been continued poverty that has affected the lives of the populations of the countries. While there are numerous issues behind African poverty, corruption has emerged as one of the critical drivers. To address the problem of corruption African governments have been forced to experiment with different strategies, one of which has been the establishment of anti-corruption agencies. Swaziland is one of the African countries that has a huge problem of corruption, and has responded with the formation of an anti-corruption agency. However, since its inception, the agency has failed to operate effectively and corruption has continued to rise. This paper highlights the problem of corruption in Swaziland and the steps taken to curb it. The paper shows that the legal framework and the agency created to combat corruption have failed to yield the desired results, and continues to provide a critical analysis of such failure. It argues that the main issue behind the failure of the agency is royal absolutism wherein the Swazi monarchy has not only become a location of corruption but also perpetuates the scourge through protecting some influential people engaged in corrupt activities.

The Corruption Problem in Swaziland: Consequences and Some Aspects of Policy to Combat It

“…The ensuing liquidity squeeze has hampered growth and employment and impacted households mainly through: (i) reduced social service delivery—both due to cuts in social expenditures and the weakening delivery systems, compounded by the lack of predictability and unclear prioritizing of government resources; and (ii) the weakened labor market, that is, layoffs, firm closures and wage cuts (African Development Bank [AfDB], Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] & United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2012; United Nations, 2012). In addition, as far back as 2006, as quoted in Simelane (2012, p. 5), His Majesty King Mswati III said in a speech to the Parliament that: While we might be able to put a lot of effort in fast-tracking our economy, we must be alert to the fact that corruption is yet another factor that cripples the nation’s development efforts. If left unchecked, corruption will certainly destroy our economy and reverse the gains of the past.…”

“…It lacks leadership; its administrative and management techniques are sloppy and archaic at best; its budget is inadequate; it lacks general capacity and the appropriate staff skills sets to undertake its mandate; and its independence has neither been observed nor encouraged. As noted by Simelane (2012), by 2009, the Swaziland ACC had failed to have a significant impact in fighting corruption, and is visibly failing to fight corruption at all levels of Swazi society in spite of being empowered with a sound legal framework.…”

Lucky Beneficiaries or Collateral Damage? The Irregular Timing and Arrangement of Chinese Watchdog Agencies

“…ACA studies, many funded by international organizations such as World Bank and Transparency International, primarily center on summarizing successful models and strategies for effectively curbing corruption. These models usually include unrealistic expectations for developing and undemocratic contexts, except for adding another layer of bureaucracy (Asamoah and Ofosu-Mensah, 2018; Prateeppornnarong, 2021; Simelane, 2012). The extant China studies on anti-corruption are preoccupied with either anti-corruption campaigns or formal institutions, the latter of which occasionally serve as object lessons in ACA studies, while factionalism scholarship provides some insights on the target selection of the former.…”