The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa

Gill, Bates; Reilly, James

doi:10.1162/wash.2007.30.3.37

Cited by 132 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Evidently, the range of drivers of Chinese investments in Africa, with particular reference to Kenya, is not confined to asset or resource seeking as suggested 27 in some of the literature (e.g. Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013), or political intention as contended by Gill and Reilly (2007). In reality, the organisations see themselves as competitors, even more so if they are in the same industry, bidding for the same project contracts.…”

Section: Re-examining Presumed Homogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Chinese management practices in Kenya: toward a post-colonial critique

Kamoche

Siebers

2014

The International Journal of Human Resource Management

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While transforming the investment, trading and infrastructural landscape in Africa, Chinese firms are also generating much-publicised controversy about their real motives. Many of the large Chinese firms operating in Africa focus mostly but not exclusively on engineering, infrastructural projects and mining. This Africa-China engagement has only recently begun to receive critical attention in the area of management and organisation studies. With reference to Kenya, we found that this phenomenon is characterised by four key themes: the unique yet diverse motivations of investors, the challenge of reconciling cross-cultural differences, the impact of low-cost strategies, and the boundary-spanning role of managers. This paper also considers the extent to which post-colonial theory might serve as an analytical lens for examining the perceptions and attitudes of Chinese managers as well as the experiences of the Africans who work for them.

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Section: Re-examining Presumed Homogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, Africa has previously played a key role in supporting China's quest for soft power (Snow, 1988). Thus, observers contend that China's involvement in Africa is politically motivated (Gill and Reilly, 2007), and lopsided, favouring the much more politically and economically powerful China (e.g. Foster et al, 2008;Kamoche, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chinese management practices in Kenya: toward a post-colonial critique

Kamoche

Siebers

2014

The International Journal of Human Resource Management

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“…For example, SOEs often have non-economic goals that distinguish them from profit-maximizing private business (Ellstrand, Tiyanyi, & Johnson, 2002). The political agenda of the state may compel SOEs to engage in risky FDI to fulfil political missions, such as securing energy to fuel domestic economic growth, accessing advanced technologies, and increasing geopolitical influence (Chen, 2008;Gill & Reilly, 2007). Therefore, SOEs' FDI could operate as the spearheads of a developmental and geopolitical vision that emanates primarily from the central state (Gozales-Vincente, 2001).…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

State-owned MNCs and host country expropriation risk: The role of home state soft power and economic gunboat diplomacy

2014

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Expropriation risk has a binding effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, state-owned multinational corporation (MNCs) may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the political influence of their home government. The magnitude of this counter force, we argue, may vary, depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state, and the level of economic dependence of the host country on the home market. We find supporting evidence of our hypotheses using Chinese firm level FDI information between 2003 and 2010.

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“…This is a major conundrum for the Chinese government wishing, as it does, to safeguard Beijing's image abroad as a 'responsible power' and it is not restricted to Sino-African relations. China's corporate engagement with Africa has thus been exaggerated whilst the 'China Inc. model' is far less efficient and monolithic than is often assumed 148 . There is also the increasing presence of smaller, provincially backed companies operating overseas.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…McGregor 150 reports, for example, that a range of diplomatic scholars in Beijing have recently noted how the SOE's have often 'hijacked' China's diplomatic initiatives in Africa (especially in Sudan), pursuing profit at the expense of broader national interests. These oversight agencies do not enjoy direct lines of authority over Chinese corporations overseas: "As it deepens, the Chinese government will more likely find itself hamstrung by…an increasing set of tensions and contradictions between the interests and aims of government principals-the bureaucracies based in Beijing tasked with advancing China's overall national interests-and the aims and interests of ostensible agents-the companies and businesspersons operating on the ground in Africa" 151 .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%