The timing of retirement — New evidence from Swiss female workers

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Timing of Retirement -New Evidence from Swiss Female Workers Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate the responsiveness of individual retirement decisions to changes in financial incentives. A reform increased women's normal retirement age (NRA) in two steps from age 62 to age 63 first and then to age 64. At the same time retirement at the previous NRA became possible at a benefit discount. Since the reform affected specific birth cohorts we can identify causal effects. We find strong and robust behavioral effects of changes in financial retirement incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4 percent induces a decline in the age-specific annual retirement probability by over 50 percent. The response to changes in financial retirement benefits varies with educational background: those with low education respond most strongly to an increase in the price of leisure.JEL-Code: J260, H550, J140.

The effects of increasing the normal retirement age on health care utilization and mortality

“…3 For example, Mastrobuoni (2009) and Song and Manchester (2007) show that the labor force exit in the USA amount to about half the age increase. Hanel and Riphahn (2012) and Lalive and Staubli (2015) show that the Swiss 2-year increase delayed women's average exit by 7.7 months.…”

Closing Routes to Retirement: How Do People Respond?

“…Similar to other studies, we exploit cohort-speci c variation in incentives to retire (e.g., Mastrobuoni, 2009;Hanel and Riphahn, 2012;Cribb et al, 2014;Lalive and Staubli, 2014;Atalay and Barrett, 2015;Manoli and Weber, 2016;Engels et al, 2016). In contrast to previous studies, the reform we analyze is a large one-time change of pension rules.…”

Are financial retirement incentives more effective if pension knowledge is high?

“…30 How to influence retirement behavior and how to delay job exits are relevant questions at times of aging societies. Probably the most important implication from this study is that programs aiming to raise the retirement age are more effective once the perception and understanding of financial incentives is improved.…”