The trade depressing and trade diversion effects of antidumping actions: The case of China

Park, Soonchan

doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2009.03.006

Cited by 45 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The choice of the most recent period common to all importers guarantees that we are excluding the first few years after the introduction of an AD law when the AD system is not yet well established. 21 Denoting this variable   , our theoretical model suggests that the AD measures introduced by other countries affect an importing country's decision to introduce an AD measure only for intermediate values of   . To allow for such a nonlinear effect, we introduce both   and its squared term.…”

Section: Econometric Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prusa (1997) finds substantial tradediversion effects for US AD measures, while Konings et al (2001) find no such effect for a sample of EU AD cases. 3 Similarly, Ganguli (2008) and Park (2009) document significant 2 There is also a (short) literature on how individual firms react to the introduction of AD measures (see footnote 8 for some references). 3 However, Brenton (2001) does find evidence of trade-diversion effects in the case of EU AD measures.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Antidumping Echoing

Tabakis¹,

Zanardi

2014

SSRN Journal

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This paper examines the determinants of "echoing" in antidumping (AD) cases (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter). We develop a dynamic game in which two competing importers can choose to impose an AD duty on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their importcompeting industries), we find that a country imposes an AD duty in the first (second) period independently of the other country's actions if its political-economy parameter is "very high" ("high"). Instead, it never introduces AD measures when its politicaleconomy parameter is below a critical "low" threshold. Echoing occurs for intermediate values of the political-economy parameter: a country chooses to impose an AD duty in the second period if and only if the competing importer has done so in the first period. Using a novel AD dataset, we document that echoing is a common practice among both traditional and new users of AD. In line with the conclusions of the theoretical model, the econometric results show that AD measures are more likely to be introduced in response to other countries' measures when governments care to some extent, but not too much, about their import-competing industries. Thus, this paper shows that countries' political-economy-driven trade policies are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.

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Section: Econometric Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antidumping Echoing

Tabakis¹,

Zanardi

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…AD measures, whereas Konings, Vandenbussche, and Springael (2001) find limited trade-diversion effects for a sample of EU AD cases (but Brenton 2001 does find evidence of significant trade-diversion effects in the case of EU AD measures). Similarly, Ganguli (2008) and Park (2009) document substantial AD trade-diversion effects for India and China, respectively. Along these lines, Bown and Crowley (2007) is the paper closest in spirit to our analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Antidumping Echoing

Tabakis¹,

Zanardi

2016

Economic Inquiry

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This article documents that antidumping (AD) “echoing” (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import‐competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political‐economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political‐economy‐driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation. (JEL F12, F13, F14)

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“…It demonstrates that anti-dumping tariffs have import-restricting effects. Park [23] in his works analysed the influence of anti-dumping tariffs on import studying Chinese data from 2002 to 2004 using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The results show that the anti-dumping protection has far-reaching effects on the inhibition and deflection of the trade.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Machine prediction of US imports from the PRC in the context of mutual sanctions

Šuleř

Mareček

2020

SHS Web Conf.

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The aim of this paper is to mechanically predict the import of the United States of America (USA) from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The trade restrictions of the USA and the PRC caused by the USA feeling of imbalance of trade between the two states have significantly influenced not only the trade between the two players, but also the overall climate of international trade. The result of this paper is the finding that multilayer perceptron networks (MLP) appear to be an excellent tool for predicting USA imports from the PRC. MLP networks can capture both the trend of the entire time series and its seasonal fluctuations. It also emerged that time series delays need to be applied. Acceptable results are shown to delay series of the order of 5 and 10 months. The mutual sanctions of both countries did not have a significant impact on the outcome of the machine learning prediction.

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The trade depressing and trade diversion effects of antidumping actions: The case of China

Cited by 45 publications

References 18 publications

Antidumping Echoing

Antidumping Echoing

Antidumping Echoing

Machine prediction of US imports from the PRC in the context of mutual sanctions

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