The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Role of Computable General Equilibrium Modelling: An Exercise in ‘Managing Fictional Expectations’

Ville, Ferdi De; Siles‐Brügge, Gabriel

doi:10.1080/13563467.2014.983059

Cited by 33 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…For the latter, this is a notoriously subjective exercise, with the modeller exercising considerable discretion within their 'black box' (see Raza et al 2014, De Ville andSiles-Brügge 2015). Very little information on the method for calculating NTBs is provided in the summary of the cross-Whitehall study released by the Brexit Committee, although some of the estimates of additional Brexitinduced trade costs have been provided (see Exiting the EU Committee 2018, pp.…”

Section: Econometric Modelling As Technocratic Repressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the former, De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015 have drawn on the work of Beckert (2013aBeckert ( , 2013b into the 'management of fictional expectations'. They argue that CGE models, commonly used to predict the impact of trade agreements, have been a key political tool in promoting the controversial EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).…”

Section: The Affective Political Economy Of Expert Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

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Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’? Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

Siles‐Brügge

2018

New Political Economy

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A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a 'hard' break with the European Union's (EU's) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on 'post-truth' politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric ('gravity') models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of 'hard' Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its 'kith and kin' in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK 'national business model'. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK's future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.

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Section: Econometric Modelling As Technocratic Repressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Affective Political Economy Of Expert Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’? Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

Siles‐Brügge

2018

New Political Economy

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“…The importance of integrating (academic) research in trade policy has been emphasised in recent research (see e.g., Tussie, 2009 ). The use of impact assessments as a tool for governance is but one example thereof (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015 ;Radaelli, 2009 ). The quality of input brought into the policy process and the manner in which when studying the impact of the German and Belgian coordination mechanism on a series of EU directives (Sepos, 2005 ) such data has been critically assessed and aggregated determines, to a large extent, whether an administration can accurately derive their interest in a trade negotiation.…”

Section: Topic 3: Human Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

National Administrations in EU Trade Policy

Adriaensen¹

2016

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The series maps the range of disciplines addressing the study of European public administration. In particular, contributions to the series will engage with the role and nature of the evolving bureaucratic processes of the European Union, including the study of the EU's civil service, of organization aspects of individual institutions such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the External Action Service, the European Parliament, the European Court and the European Central Bank and of inter-institutional relations among these and other actors. The series also welcomes contributions on the growing role of EU agencies, networks of technical experts and national offi cials, and of the administrative dimension of multilevel governance including international organizations. Of particular interest in this respect will be the emergence of a European diplomatic service and the management of the EU's expanding commercial, foreign, development, security and defence policies, as well as the role of institutions in a range of other policy areas of the Union.Beyond this strong focus of EU administrative governance, the series will also include texts on the development and practice of administrative governance within European states. This may include contributions to the administrative history of Europe, which is not just about rules and regulations governing bureaucracies, or about formal criteria for measuring the growth of bureaucracies, but rather about the concrete workings of public administration, both in its executive functions as in its involvement in policy-making. Furthermore the series will include studies on the interaction between the national and European level, with particular attention for the impact of the EU on domestic administrative systems.More information about this series at

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“…We can reasonably exclude the 'bells and whistles' which Rodrik (2015) rightly calls suspect (see De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015). The only credible way in which trade liberalization may raise trend growth as in Figure 3 is if it induces additional capital formation.…”

Section: T0 Timementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is only 'rational' for (potential) losers to be worried about the consequences of freeing trade, especially in the real world where adjustments (searching new jobs, moving houses, going for additional schooling, closing down one's factory, taking a new loan for setting up a new firm) are costly. Downplaying such adjustment costs (see De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015), neoclassical trade theory holds that free trade is welfareimproving, because winners can in principle compensate losers (preferably through lump-sum transfer schemes) and still be better off themselves (since overall net gains of trade liberalization are positive, even if trivial). However, the instruments to implement such lump-sum transfers are generally not available, and creating and implementing them is an uncertain and politically contested process.…”

Section: On the Static Gains From Trade Liberalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

CETA without Blinders: How Cutting “Trade Costs and More” Will Cause Unemployment, Inequality, and Welfare Losses

Storm

Kohler

2016

International Journal of Political Economy

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Proponents of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) emphasize its prospective economic benefits, with economic growth increasing due to rising trade volumes and investment. Widely cited official projections suggest modest GDP gains after about a decade, varying from between 0.003% to 0.08% in the European Union and between 0.03% to 0.76% in Canada. However, all these quantitative projections stem from the same trade model, which assumes full employment and neutral (if not constant) income distribution in all countries, excluding from the outset any of the major risks of deeper liberalization. This lack of intellectual diversity and of realism shrouding the debate around CETA's alleged economic benefits calls for an alternative assessment grounded in more realistic modeling premises.In this paper, we provide alternative projections of CETA's economic effects using the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM). Allowing for changes in employment and income distribution, we obtain very different results. In contrast to positive outcomes projected with full-employment models, we find CETA will lead to intra-EU trade diversion. More importantly, in the current context of tepid economic growth, competitive pressures induced by CETA will cause unemployment, inequality and welfare losses. At a minimum, this shows that official studies do not offer a solid basis for an informed decision on CETA. AcknowledgementsWe would like to thank Alex Izurieta for suggestions on how to best apply the Global Policy Model and for commenting on earlier drafts, as well as Jeronim Capaldo,

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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Role of Computable General Equilibrium Modelling: An Exercise in ‘Managing Fictional Expectations’

Cited by 33 publications

References 53 publications

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’? Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’? Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

National Administrations in EU Trade Policy

CETA without Blinders: How Cutting “Trade Costs and More” Will Cause Unemployment, Inequality, and Welfare Losses

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