The Trudeau government and GIC appointments in Canada

Abstract

PurposeAccording to the traditional view of public administration, a critical component of good policy formulation is the provision of frank and fearless advice to elected decision-makers. This advice can be provided by permanent public officials or by the people selected by the elected governments to fill key and continuing posts. However, there are major questions as to whether new Governor-in-Council (GIC) appointment processes rooted in new public governance (NPG) are yielding the expected results promised, such as less partisanism, as a consideration for appointment.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a mixed methods approach to examine the GIC process as it is used in Canada. In using these methods, the authors employed interviews with senior officials, governmental documents review and expert validation interviews to triangulate its main findings.FindingsThe paper uses the case of the revised appointment process for GIC appointments in Canada and suggests that the new arrangements do not deliver on merit-based criteria that ensures independence is protected between political executive and senior bureaucratic officials. Although new processes may be more open and transparent than past processes, the paper suggests that such processes are more susceptible to partisan influence under the guise of being merit-based.Research limitations/implicationsThe research was limited to one country context, Canada. As such, it will be necessary to expand this to other Westminster countries. Testing whether manifestations of new public governance in appointment processes elsewhere will be important to validate whether Canada is unique or not.Practical implicationsThe authors are left to wonder if this innovation of merit-based appointments in the new administrative state is obscuring the lines of accountability and whether it forms the basis for good policy advice despite promises to the contrary.Social implicationsTrust in the government is affected by decisions behind closed doors. They appear partisan, even when they may not be. Process matters if only to highlight increased value placed on meritorious appointments.Originality/valuePrevious studies on GIC appointments have generally been to explore representation as a value. That is, studies have questioned whether diversity is maintained, for example. However, few studies have explored appointment processes using institutional approaches to examine whether reforms to such processes have respected key principles, such as merit and accountability.

Internal governmental performance and accountability in Canada: Insights and lessons for post‐pandemic improvement

“…This managerialist approach (Wright, 2000) assumed that bureaucracy had become unresponsive to political decision‐makers and citizens, and that the repair was to replace rigid command‐and‐control systems with management discretion, to improve process rather than structure, and to incorporate market‐style competition into budgeting systems rather than rely on incremental and stable budgetary allocations (Boston et al, 1996). Specific strategies embraced by the NPM included cutting rules and hierarchies, empowering public servants, increasing innovation in policy solutions, managing for results, and increased attention to monitoring systems to make accountability more transparent (Gore, 1996; Peters & Savoie, 1996), some of which were intended to restore lines of accountability displaced by the NPM by ensuring stronger connections between policy and service delivery results and the priorities and revenue capacity of government (Brock & Shepherd, 2022; Brock, 2020; Richards et al, 2017).…”

“…Networked governance across various sectors and actors is seen as an effective means to incent the public sector into action to achieve governmental aims, especially as government control and hierarchical lines of accountability are weakened (Hudon & Rouillard, 2015; Osborne, 2006). NPG places emphasis on interorganizational governance driven by networked leadership; interdependence of organizations in policy design and delivery; decentering the state in policy development with shared acknowledgement of partner expertise and knowledge; use of partnerships to address complex policy problems with far‐reaching externalities and a plurality of actors, resources and knowledge working together in autonomous networks from state control and direction, and share in the allocation of public resources (Brock & Shepherd, 2022; Fierlbeck, 2010). NPG strategies for collaboration involve co‐production, co‐management and co‐governance (Conteh, 2018).…”

Comparing Trudeau and Harper Canadian federal appointments to agencies, boards, and commissions

“…However, evidence of patronage in hiring processes remained a fundamental concern for government officials and their ability to fill public service vacancies for the next seventy years. After outgoing Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau appointed more than seventy Liberal friends and insiders to various GIC positions in 1984, it framed the discussion for the next leader of the Liberal party, John Turner (Brock and Shepherd 2018). As a salient public concern, Brian Mulroney, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, acted opportunistically by making this a central issue during the 1984 election, helping him secure a majority government (Brock and Shepherd 2018).…”

“…Among the fifty-nine main recommendations were six that related to patronage appointments. The reforms suggested were means to ensure that the government nominates the best possible person, help the public see the process as more than favouritism, and develop criteria to scrutinize GIC appointments (Brock and Shepherd 2018). Despite these efforts, there were several occasions where Mulroney managed to get in his own way.…”

Guest editorial: Rethinking the state of the administrative state: Is the state back in?

“…Thus, administrative (competent) appointments are vital for the successful role of the state in addressing wicked problems. It is based on this idea that the paper by Brock and Shepherd (2022) examines the current Canadian government's governor-in-council (GIC) appointment processes to examine whether the approach leads to appointments based on merit, a criterion of bringing in competent bureaucratic personnel to the administrative state. The authors are of the view that although the new GIC process seems to focus on merit, in actuality, the new arrangements do not deliver on merit-based criteria that ensure that the independence of bureaucratic personnel and institutions are protected between political executive and senior bureaucratic officials.…”