The Truth About the Truth: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Truth Effect

Abstract

Repetition has been shown to increase subjective truth ratings of trivia statements. This truth effect can be measured in two ways: (a) as the increase in subjective truth from the first to the second encounter ( within-items criterion) and (b) as the difference in truth ratings between repeated and other new statements ( between-items criterion). Qualitative differences are assumed between the processes underlying both criteria. A meta-analysis of the truth effect was conducted that compared the two criteria. In all, 51 studies of the repetition-induced truth effect were included in the analysis. Results indicate that the between-items effect is larger than the within-items effect. Moderator analyses reveal that several moderators affect both effects differentially. This lends support to the notion that different psychological comparison processes may underlie the two effects. The results are discussed within the processing fluency account of the truth effect.

Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

“…Further evidence supporting this interpretation has come from studies addressing the so-called truth effect-that is, the phenomenon that repeatedly presented statements are more likely to be accepted as true than new statements (for a review, see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). A common explanation for the truth effect is that repetition increases processing fluency and that people tend to judge fluently processed statements as true (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999).…”

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

“…One would have to assume that participants are aware that subjectively experienced increases in retrieval fluency during an experimental session are merely due to repeated presentations of that object, and are thus not diagnostic of one's true familiarity with that object (cf. Dechêne et al, 2009Dechêne et al, , 2010Hansen & Wänke, 2013;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). Studying the effect of experimentally manipulated fluency on FH use, Hertwig et al (2008, Exp.…”

Paradigma associado ao estudo da ilusão de verdade

“…Designam-se estas de "afirmações neutras". A necessidade de ter este tipo de estímulos ambíguos quanto ao seu estatuto de verdade está relacionado com o facto de que quando os participantes têm conhecimento factual sobre as afirmações, então irão responder com base nesse conhecimento, tornando-se imunes aos efeitos da repetição sobre as suas respostas (Dechêne et al, 2010).…”

“…Dentro do paradigma do efeito de verdade podem ser definidos dois contextos de apresentação/ avaliação dos estímulos (Dechêne et al, 2010): o mais frequentemente encontrado define-se como um contexto heterogéneo, no qual os participantes são expostos a uma lista mista de estímulos repetidos e novos (e.g., Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989;Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011). Neste contexto, o efeito de verdade é analisado numa comparação entre as avaliações dos estímulos repetidos e as avaliações dos estímulos novos, isto é, uma comparação entre-ítens (Dechêne et al, 2010).…”

“…Neste contexto, o efeito de verdade é analisado numa comparação entre as avaliações dos estímulos repetidos e as avaliações dos estímulos novos, isto é, uma comparação entre-ítens (Dechêne et al, 2010). Diferentemente, num contexto homogéneo os participantes fazem os julgamentos de verdade relativamente a um mesmo conjunto de estímulos apresentados na fase de exposição e repetidos nas fases subsequentes (e.g., Dechêne et al, 2009;Schwartz, 1982).…”