The turn of the valve: representing with material models

Frigg, Roman; Nguyen, James

doi:10.1007/s13194-017-0182-4

Cited by 41 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…A key is needed to translate the properties exemplified by the representational vehicle into properties of a target system. Frigg and Nguyen (2018) analyze Phillips-Newlyn hydraulic model of macroeconomy that is a concrete object consisting of pipes and reservoirs with water flowing through it. This example shows that a material machine can, under interpretation, exemplify some features to be imputed to actual economies, e.g.…”

Section: The Deki Account Of Model-based Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Models, Fictions and Artifacts

Knuuttila

2021

Language and Scientific Research

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Section: The Deki Account Of Model-based Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Models, Fictions and Artifacts

Knuuttila

2021

Language and Scientific Research

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“…In the case of 3-D models, such as the Phillips-Newlyn hydraulic model of macroeconomy, there is a concrete object that exemplifies, under interpretation, the features to be imputed (Frigg and Nguyen 2018). However, the case of nonconcrete models, such as mathematical models, is trickier, since there is no concrete model object providing the "base" for representation.…”

Section: Fictions As Imagined-objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic fictions: turning imagined biological systems into concrete ones

Knuuttila

Koskinen

2020

Synthese

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The recent discussion of fictional models has focused on imagination, implicitly considering fictions as something nonconcrete. We present two cases from synthetic biology that can be viewed as concrete fictions. Both minimal cells and alternative genetic systems are modal in nature: they, as well as their abstract cousins, can be used to study unactualized possibilia. We approach these synthetic constructs through Vaihinger’s notion of a semi-fiction and Goodman’s notion of semifactuality. Our study highlights the relative existence of such concrete fictions. Before their realizations neither minimal cells nor alternative genetic systems were any well-defined objects, and the subsequent experimental work has given more content to these originally schematic imaginings. But it is as yet unclear whether individual members of these heterogeneous groups of somewhat functional synthetic constructs will eventually turn out to be fully realizable, remain only partially realizable, or prove outright impossible.

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“…A good example of a creative scientific model whose epistemic value can be spelt out in terms of the clarification of a tradition is the MONIAC or Phillip's hydraulic machine from 1949 (Vines 2000;Morgan 2012;Frigg and Nguyen 2017). Phillip's machine is a model consisting of a system of tanks, valves and pipes through which water flows, and that aimed at representing the dynamics of market demands in an economy.…”

Section: Worth Of Creativity In Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Novel & worthy: creativity as a thick epistemic concept

Sánchez-Dorado

2020

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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The standard view in current philosophy of creativity says that being creative has two requirements: being novel and being valuable (to which a third intentionality requirement is often added; Sternberg and Lubart 1999; Boden 2004; Gaut 2010). The standard view on creativity has recently become an object of critical scrutiny. Hills and Bird (2018) have specifically proposed to remove the value requirement from the definition, as it is not clear that creative objects are necessarily valuable or creative people necessarily praiseworthy. In this paper, I argue against Hills and Bird (2018), since eliminating the element of value from the explanation of creativity hinders the understanding of the role that creative products play in actual epistemic practices, which are fundamentally normative. More specifically, I argue that the terms ‘creativity’ and ‘creative’ function as thick epistemic concepts when employed by competent epistemic agents in practice, that is, these concepts have both a descriptive and an evaluative content that cannot be disentangled from one another. Accordingly, I suggest that philosophers should prefer thick accounts over thin accounts of creativity. A thick account of creativity is one that endorses the standard view at its basis, but further develops it in two ways: by stressing the entanglement of the value and novelty requirements; by permitting to encompass a range of domain-specific characterizations of such entanglement for different epistemic situations. In order to take the first steps in the development of such a thick account of creativity, I look at the domain of scientific practices as a case in point, and try to spell out what the thickness (or entanglement of novelty and worth) of creative instances typically entails here. Namely, I identify the worthy novelty of creative models and methods with their potential to clarify a tradition, with fruitfulness, and with the fulfilment of exploratory aims.

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The turn of the valve: representing with material models

Cited by 41 publications

References 47 publications

Models, Fictions and Artifacts

Models, Fictions and Artifacts

Synthetic fictions: turning imagined biological systems into concrete ones

Novel & worthy: creativity as a thick epistemic concept

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