The U.S.S.R. and Third-World Conflicts: Domestic Debate and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967–1973

Abstract

Soviet foreign policy underwent a significant change in orientation in the early 1970s. Emphasis on the pursuit of a new, more constructive relationship with the United States gave way to a primary focus on competition with the U.S. for influence and strategic presence in the third world, and there was a notable reduction of traditional restraints on the conduct of that competition. The article focuses on Soviet policy in the region and the period in which this redirection of policy was first manifested—the Middle East between the June 1967 and the October 1973 wars; it explains this major change by an analysis of the divergent images of the United States and of U.S.-Soviet relations that were held by Soviet elites, and the outcome of conflict among holders of the respective images.

Modeling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt

“…But to at least some within the Soviet leadership, detente did not extend to superpower relations with Third-World countries. Increasingly in the early 1970s, Marshall Grechko, representing Soviet military interests, pushed for more Soviet involvement in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt (see Golan 1984;Kass 1978;Spechler 1986).…”

“…To bolster their position, the Soviet leadership signed a Treaty of Friendship with Egypt and sent Sadat some sophisticated weapons but kept these weapons under Soviet operational control. The Soviet leaders continued to drag their feet on supplying Sadat with the strategic, offensive weapons he thought he needed to wage war with Israel (see Spechler 1986): 'The gap between Soviet pledges and Soviet deliveries actually widened during this period" (Breslauer 1983, 91).…”

“…A few scholars (Dawisha 1979;Kass 1978;Spechler 1986) have emphasized the coalition shifts within the leadership in explaining the Soviet decision to support Egypt's move toward a war footing. As Dawisha (1979, 150) notes, the "continu-ous coalition-building and consensus formation" among competing institutional and leadership groups led to the seeming contradiction in positions toward arming Egypt evident from 1971 through 1973.…”

“…As Dawisha (1979, 150) notes, the "continu-ous coalition-building and consensus formation" among competing institutional and leadership groups led to the seeming contradiction in positions toward arming Egypt evident from 1971 through 1973. Focusing on what characterized the competing leadership coalitions, Spechler (1986) stresses the importance of images of detente with the United States. She argues that Soviet decision making on the Middle East during the early 1970s was the product of a struggle among leaders holding "cooperative," "competitive," and "antagonistic" images of East-West relations.…”

“…The particular issues we have chosen to examine build on the cooperative and antagonistic images of the United States that Spechler (1986) identified among Politburo members during the 1967-73 time period. Spechler observed that these two images had implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict.…”