Modeling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt

Abstract

We present a contingency model of Soviet foreign policy making that focuses on decision making in the Politburo. The model is designed around three questions and shows how the answers to these questions determine the likely nature of the decision the Politburo will reach at any point in time. The questions are (1) Whose positions on the Politburo are critical to making a decision? (2) What are the positions or preferences of those who count on the issue under consideration? (3) How are disagreements among these individuals handled? The model is illustrated by examining the Soviet decision to increase significantly the numbers and types of weapons delivered to Egypt in early 1973. Of interest in this case is accounting for the shift in Soviet policy from refusing Egypt offensive weapons to providing them.

How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework

“…The theories and decision logics embedded in each of the different types of decision units will be explicated further in the next three pieces in this special issue. (For more detail on the development of the ideas presented here see Hermann and Hermann, 1982;Hermann and Hermann, 1985;Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, 1987;Hermann and Hermann, 1989;Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989;Hagan, 1993;C. Hermann, 1993;M.…”

Psychological Influences on the Policy Choices of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

“…This need not imply that these factors, or even these individuals, will have a substantial effect on every decision. There is a large literature on foreign policy decision-making detailing the circumstances when individual decision-makers are most likely to have a personal effect on state policy (Hermann, 1984(Hermann, , 2001Greenstein, 1987;Hermann and Hermann, 1989;Stewart et al, 1989;Byman and Pollack, 2001;Hermann et al, 2001;Preston, 2001). But here I find a general relationship between the fundamental psychological characteristics of foreign ministers and state policy in a variety of international conflicts across a varied set of governments.…”

Terrorism and Small Groups

“…Yet terrorist public statements are readily observable and it may be possible to use these to empirically assess propositions as has been done for groupthink among political leaders (Tetlock, 1979). The Soviet-era Kremlin was a famously closed leadership group but public statements by its members have been used to analyze its group decision-making processes (Stewart, Hermann, & Hermann, 1989). Terrorist rhetoric has been used to assess the leadership styles of terrorist leaders (M. G. Hermann & Sakiev, 2011) and in cases where multiple individuals within terrorist groups make statements and give interviews, it is possible that group differences and processes may be revealed.…”