The Ukraine war and the emergence of the European commission as a geopolitical actor

Håkansson, Calle

doi:10.1080/07036337.2023.2239998

Cited by 24 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…These initiatives support the claim that in areas where the Commission has resources and competences (industrial and competition policy), we might see a stronger support for SA (Håkansson, 2023;Haroche, 2020). Having said that, the Commission has been able to gain support for these initiatives by aligning with the interests of France (#2 and #3), which has long sought to promote a European defence market to fence off competition from external actors (Bora, 2023).…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 54%

“…By contrast to slow progress in achieving an agreement on political and operational SA, we see some steady progress in relation to industrial autonomy, an area where the Commission has been able to carve out an increasing role owing to its budgetary powers and competences in matters of industrial policy (Håkansson, 2023). Starting with the Council Conclusions of December 2013, there are increasing references to the industrial dimension of SA, with cognitive arguments relating to strengthening the competitiveness of the EU's defence industry used to justify the need to 'enhance strategic autonomy' (European Council, 2013).…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 85%

“…This push for SA has allowed the Commission to strengthen its authority and resources in the area of defence, the creation of DG DEFIS being a case in point, which has enabled it to pursue further initiatives in response to the war in Ukraine (Håkansson, 2023). However, Russia's war of aggression has also challenged the role of the Commission in this area.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ideational Power of Strategic Autonomy in EU Security and External Economic Policies

Juncos,

Vanhoonacker

2024

J of Common Market Studies

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This article undertakes a comparative analysis of European Union security and external economic policies to explore the different trajectories of strategic autonomy (SA) in these two domains. In so doing, it contributes to a better understanding of endogenous drivers of policy change in response to geopoliticising pressures. Drawing on discursive institutionalism, it analyses three dimensions of ideational power: power in, power through and power over. The evidence, based on documentary analysis and interviews, demonstrates that though SA presented a more significant challenge to pre‐established paradigms in external economic relations, the role of the Commission as an ideational entrepreneur, supported by its coercive power, facilitated the adoption of the idea of (open) SA. Conversely, French President Emmanuel Macron was unable to persuade others of the adoption of a sovereigntist conception of SA in security, with the exception of defence industrial policy, where the Commission enjoys budgetary power and competences.

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Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 54%

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ideational Power of Strategic Autonomy in EU Security and External Economic Policies

Juncos,

Vanhoonacker

2024

J of Common Market Studies

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“…Dette forklarer også hvorfor von der Leyens presidentperiode (2019-2024) har vaert preget av et ønske om å bygge opp en mer geopolitisk orientert kommisjon. Bakgrunnen er at mange av politikkområdene som Kommisjonen tradisjonelt har hatt ansvar for relatert til det indre marked, slik som handel, investeringer, konkurranse, teknologi eller finans, har fått en geopolitisk eller sikkerhetspolitisk dimensjon (Håkansson, 2023).…”

Section: En Geopolitisk Kommisjonunclassified

“…Mens Nato langt på vei har gått tilbake til sine kjerneoppgaver og bidrar til avskrekking, forsvar og beroligelse for medlemslandene (Nato, 2023b) har EU prioritert å levere det Nato ikke kan tilby: sanksjoner, humanitaer hjelp, økonomisk kompensasjon for våpen EU-landene donerer og perspektiv for Ukraina om fremtidig deltakelse i et politisk fellesskap (Droin, 2023). Krigen har også ført med seg et ønske om å styrke samarbeidet mellom EU og Nato ytterligere (Biscop, 2022;Håkansson, 2023). Et slikt samarbeid var imidlertid godt i gang før krigen og det ble understreket både i EUs strategiske kompass fra 2022 (EEAS, 2022), i Natos strategiske konsept og i flere felleserklaeringer.…”

Section: En Geopolitisk Kommisjonunclassified

EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge

Rieker,

Riddervold,

Gunnarsdottir

2023

Internasjonal Politikk

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EUs samlede respons på krigen i Ukraina illustrerer bredden i EUs utenrikspolitiske virkemidler og medlemslandenes økte vilje til å løse felles utfordringer innenfor EU systemet. Det har også blitt tydeligere hvordan EU og Nato i økende grad komplementerer hverandre. Krigen og en endret geopolitisk situasjon illustrerer også hvordan sikkerhet i økende grad spiller over i andre politikkområder i EU som handel, energi, teknologi, kommunikasjon og kritiske råvarer. Vi befinner oss dermed i en europeisk sikkerhetspolitisk kontekst som er radikalt endret siden 1994. En hovedutfordring for Norge er at avtalene med EU ikke reflekterer denne utviklingen. For å kompensere for dette må man dermed stadig søke å inngå nye avtaler for å sikre norske sikkerhetspolitiske interesser, noe som er krevende og uforutsigbart. Så langt har det for eksempel skapt utfordringer knyttet til en eventuell norsk tilknytning til EUs nye satellittkommunikasjonssamarbeid (IRIS²) og helseunion. Denne artikkelen diskuterer EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge. Vi redegjør for viktige utviklingstrekk og drivere av EUs utenrikspolitikk, før vi går litt mer i dybden på hva slags utenrikspolitisk aktør EU er i dag. Til slutt diskuterer vi betydningen av denne utviklingen for Norge. Abstract in English:EU Foreign and Security Policy and Their Implications for NorwayThe European Union’s (EU) collective response to Russia’s war on Ukraine illustrates the breadth of the EU’s foreign policy tools and Member States’ increased willingness to address common challenges within the EU-system. How the EU and NATO increasingly complement each other has also become clearer. The war and a changed geopolitical situation also illustrate how security increasingly spills over into other policy areas in the EU, such as trade, energy, technology, communication and critical raw materials. We therefore find ourselves in a European security policy context that has radically changed since 1994. A key challenge for Norway is that its agreements with the EU do not reflect these developments. To compensate for this, there is a continuous need to pursue new agreements in order to ensure Norwegian security interests, which is demanding and unpredictable. So far, there have been challenges related to potential Norwegian participation in the EU’s satellite-based communications collaboration (IRIS2) and the health union, for example. This article discusses the EU’s foreign and security policies, and implications for Norway. We outline important developments and drivers behind the EU’s foreign policy, before delving deeper into the kind of foreign policy actor the EU is today. Finally, we discuss the significance of this development for Norway.

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Sanctions and infrastructural ideologies: Assessing the material shaping of EU digital sovereignty in response to the war in Ukraine

ten Oever,

Perarnaud,

Kristoff

et al. 2024

Policy & Internet

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In this paper, we interrogate the sanctions instated against Russian media by the European Union (EU) in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. We do this in three ways. First, we present the outcome of extensive network measurements that show the heterogeneous implementation of the sanctions in EU Member States. Second, we explain how the sanctions fit the EU's digital sovereignty agenda. And third, we theorise the EU's digital sovereignty policies and sanctions as the emergence of a repressive state apparatus that forms a metagovernance regime with the ideological state apparatus of multistakeholder internet governance. We explain how networks are shaped in the dialectical relation between the ideological and repressive state apparatuses by showing how multistakeholder internet governance aims to stay politically neutral to accommodate the politics of different repressive state apparatuses. In turn, repressive state apparatuses define their demands in a technologically neutral way so multistakeholder internet governance can continue to develop and adapt communication networks. This research combines methods from Computer Science with theoretical frameworks from European Studies, Science and Technology Studies, Media Studies and International Relations. Through this work, we aim to contribute to the practice of interdisciplinary analysis of communication networks and debates on digital sovereignty, European infrastructuralisation, and internet governance.

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The Ukraine war and the emergence of the European commission as a geopolitical actor

Cited by 24 publications

References 67 publications

The Ideational Power of Strategic Autonomy in EU Security and External Economic Policies

The Ideational Power of Strategic Autonomy in EU Security and External Economic Policies

EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge

Sanctions and infrastructural ideologies: Assessing the material shaping of EU digital sovereignty in response to the war in Ukraine

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