The Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism

Safrin, Sabrina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1018142

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The remaining estimates fail to achieve statistical significance, with one exception. The indicator for Human Rights treaties differs statistically from the reference category and also from the other treaty types, suggesting that human rights treaties are delayed extensively, a finding consistent with arguments in the legal literature that these treaties often raise constitutional or federalism concerns for the United States (Safrin 2008(Safrin :1316Bradley 2010:331, 333). Indeed, compared to the reference category (environmental treaties), human rights treaties linger, on average, more than 15 years longer in the Senate.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 72%

“…Thus, scholars stress that the lack of US participation deprives the world of important leadership on such issues (Kormos, Grosko, and Mittermeier :663). Even if many small and medium states join various treaties, the absence of key powers like the United States can prevent the treaty from effectively addressing international problems (Safrin :13–15). Because hindrances to US participation hamper multilateral cooperation more broadly, we need to better understand their causes…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The question here is not about exceptionalism, or the acceptability of the United States opting out of international treaties based on the interests of the United States. Deliberately refraining from participating in international law may be justified by a variety of reasons and is done by a number of countries (Safrin ; Bradford and Posner ).…”

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confidence: 99%

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An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

Kelley¹,

Pevehouse

2015

Int Stud Q

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The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of US participation. We supplement these explanations with an opportunity cost theory. We argue that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time and political capital. These costs alter the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process. Statistical analysis supports the argument. The priority the Senate and President give to treaties depends not only on the value they assign to the treaty, but also on the value of the time needed to process the treaty. Presidents are less, not more, likely to transmit treaties to the Senate the more support they have in Congress. Furthermore, the more support the President has in Congress, the more the cost of Senate floor time matters for advice and consent.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 72%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

Kelley¹,

Pevehouse

2015

Int Stud Q

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“…However, it has been pointed out that the US is not alone in this regard, and the Union is increasingly discussed in such isolationist terms. 8 Studies on EU external relations law also tend to be written by experts in EU law, and primarily for a European audience. Again, this is understandable, especially given that EU external relations law can be a complex and evolving field of law, which may be of little interest to scholars from outside that discipline.…”

Section: Themementioning

confidence: 99%

The European Union’s external action: views from the outside

Odermatt

Wessel

2022

Europe and the World: A Law Review

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While most studies in EU external relations law take an inside-out perspective, the question of how the EU and its external action is viewed from the ‘outside’ is hardly ever raised in EU legal scholarship. Yet studies from the outside can help us to understand how third States and international institutions perceive the (normative) role the EU aims to play. As the EU’s external action develops, the law governing the EU’s external action has indeed received greater attention from the ‘outside’. The articles published in this special issue were presented at a workshop on ‘The European Union’s External Action and International Law: A View From the Outside’ organised by the International Law and Affairs Group (ILAG) of the City Law School and the European Society of International Law (ESIL) Interest Group on the EU as a Global Actor. This introductory article sets the scene for a special issue drawing together various outside perspectives, examining the views from selected international institutions, cooperation frameworks, and non-EU States.

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