The United Kingdom

Syrett, Keith

doi:10.1017/cbo9781107298002.006

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Efforts to portray the government as "right-eous" (Sokhi-Bulley 2016) in this area were further intensified with the replacement of control orders by TPIMs-part of a much-trumpeted "correction in favour of liberty" announced by the government in 2010 (Syrett 2015). While TPIMs are deemed a form of "light" control order (Zedner 2014), omitting some of their predecessor's egregious features, the government relied on the early House of Lords' decisions on control orders to resist calls for the abolition of non-trial-based measures in parliament and thus to entrench liberty-invading practices.…”

Section: Case Study Ii: the Uk Terrorist Prevention And Investigation...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing Through Human Rights in Counter-terrorism: Proofing, Problematization and Securitization

Hamilton

Lippert

2020

Crit Crim

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Human rights are commonly regarded as the antidote to criminalization and securitization. Yet, since 9/11, at both the national and international levels, human rights law has largely accommodated the security-oriented changes deemed necessary to combat terrorism, including the use of torture and the erection of a "shadow" system of justice through the use of coercive non-trial-based measures (Gearty 2017;Hamilton 2018). In this article, we examine taken-for-granted features of modern legal adjudication and "human rights proofing" (forms of human rights protection) that dilute the restraining power of human rights law and extend security measures. Informed by a "governmental criminological" analysis of human rights in the security field, we present two case studies to illustrate these arguments. The first considers "human rights proofing" mechanisms in the United Nations counter-terrorism assemblage which, we argue, have been rendered "technical" (Sokhi-Bulley 2016) through the complexity of the structures deployed to protect rights and the forms of knowledge privileged by experts. The second case study draws on use of control orders-Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) in the United Kingdom-and examines two governmental "techniques," namely, the judicial "balancing test" and the European Convention on Human Rights "memos" put to parliamentary committees scrutinizing counter-terrorist legislation. At both national and international levels, how human rights are being institutionalized has affected the operation of power: we are being governed through rights (Golder 2011) in ways consistent with conditions of authoritarian liberalism (Dean 2007).

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Section: Case Study Ii: the Uk Terrorist Prevention And Investigation...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing Through Human Rights in Counter-terrorism: Proofing, Problematization and Securitization

Hamilton

Lippert

2020

Crit Crim

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“…In consequence, while the French came under heavy Axis Assault, aircraft from the XII Air Support Command flew air cover for the U.S. 509th Parachute Regiment, with no enemy air or ground forces to attack in front of the Americans. 56 Each corps could exhaust all the available assets and still not fulfill its desired target requirements. This creates a situation in which no corps commander will ever be completely satisfied, which was still the case in Operation Desert Storm: Amazingly, despite a distribution of targets made by an Army deputy CINC (Waller) using lists provided by ground force commanders, and approved overall by an Army theater CINC (Schwarzkopf himself), ground commanders still complained that they weren't getting sufficient air support!…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Where to Draw the Line Between Air and Land Battle,

New¹

1995

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ADDRESSING THE services' congressionally mandated Roles and Missions review, Gen Merrill A. McPeak, at the time chief of staff of the Air Force, suggested that modern land warfare contains four "battles"--the rear battle, which includes base and supporting elements, the close battle, where the main opposing ground forces engage one another, the deep battle, incorporating hostile territory well beyond the line of contact, and the high battle, the area of air and space combat. He proposed a division of responsibility between these areas on the battlefield where the ground forces commander would fight the close and rear battles, while the air forces commander would fight the deep and high battles.General McPeak went on to say that the commander with responsibility for the close battle does not require systems or capabilities that reach across the boundaries into the deep and high battles. If there are such systems in the field or on the drawing board, they might be good candidates for retirement or transfer to another service. Alternatively, the commander with responsibility for the deep battle does not need forces that are configured for direct support of close combat operations. If there are any, they too could be transferred or cut. 2General McPeak has suggested that commanders should have full command authority and ownership of the assets used in their respective battle areas. If adopted, this concept would give the Army responsibility for its own close support, eliminating close air support as an Air Force primary function.3 This proposed arrangement would be similar to the close-air-support concept of operations practiced by the Marine Corps. Needless to say, General McPeak's suggestions have stoked old flames of debate between the air and land services.The Army has questioned the Air Force's sincerity about providing air support since World War I, when the airplane gained its importance as a new weapon of warfare. Ground commanders saw the chief task of the Air Force as support for the ground forces. Army field service regulations in effect when the United States entered World War I stated, "The infantry is the principal and most important arm, which is charged with the main work on the field of battle and decides the final issue of combat. The role of the infantry . . . is the role of the entire force. . . ." 4 While the infantry got bogged down in the trenches in World War I, advances in weapons technology and doctrine for employment, including that for the airplane, began to demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for warfare. Airmen believed airpower should be concentrated instead of divided evenly between individual ground commanders. Document Classification unclassified Classification of SF298 unclassified Classification of Abstract unclassified Limitation of Abstract unlimited Number of Pages 212 direct support of the ground advance. . . . Control of the air having been quickly gained, they were able to harass the movement of troops with virtually no interference. 5A German instruction on "The Empl...

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Speaking Rights to Power or Governing Through Rights? Making Rights Matter in the Security Field

Hamilton

2024

Palgrave Critical Studies in Human Rights and Criminology

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The United Kingdom

Cited by 6 publications

References 5 publications

Governing Through Human Rights in Counter-terrorism: Proofing, Problematization and Securitization

Governing Through Human Rights in Counter-terrorism: Proofing, Problematization and Securitization

Where to Draw the Line Between Air and Land Battle,

Speaking Rights to Power or Governing Through Rights? Making Rights Matter in the Security Field

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