The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. The War in South Vietnam. The Years of the Offensive 1965-1968

Schlight, John

doi:10.21236/ada208827

Cited by 3 publications

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“…Despite U.S. anti-infiltration efforts, the estimated number of PAVN infiltrators during 1966 was between 58,000 and 90,000 troops, including five full enemy regiments [6]. A June 1966 DIA estimate credited the North Vietnamese with 1000 km of passable roads within the corridor, at least 300 km of which were good enough for year-round use [32].…”

Section: Ground Operations In Laosmentioning

confidence: 99%

United States Secret War in Laos: Long-Term Environmental Impacts of the Use of Chemical Weapons

Olson¹,

Speidel²

2023

OJSS

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In 1959, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation, against the Pathet Lao insurgences and Viet Mien military troops and supply route, began. The Hồ Chi Minh Trail was developed after the North Vietnam government and military decided to reunify South and North Vietnam. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) then connected the old trails leading from North Vietnam panhandle southward into eastern Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Starting from Hanoi, the primary trail turned southwest into Laos and eastern Cambodia before branching into South Vietnam. Beginning in 1960s, the volume of traffic on the network of trails expanded significantly, but it still took more than a month's march, by foot and bicycle, to travel from North to South Vietnam. Hồ Chi Minh Trail traffic was impacted by repeatedly by Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF), which was supported by US Air Force tactical herbicide spraying (Operation Ranch Hand program), and US Air Force bombing runs. By the late 1960s, the trail was improved and could accommodate heavy trucks in some sections and was used to supply the annual needs of over one hundred thousand regular PAVN troops active in South Vietnam. By 1974, the trail was a well-marked series of jungle roads (some of them paved) with underground support facilities such as hospitals, fuel-storage tanks, and supply caches with weapons. The Hồ Chi Minh Trail was the major supply route for PAVN forces that overran Republic of Vietnam (RV) forces in 1975 and unified Vietnam. The primary objective of this paper is to determine the environmental and human health impacts of RLAF and US Air Force secret spraying of tactical herbicides on Hồ Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

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Section: Ground Operations In Laosmentioning

confidence: 99%

United States Secret War in Laos: Long-Term Environmental Impacts of the Use of Chemical Weapons

Olson¹,

Speidel²

2023

OJSS

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"Our equivalent of guerrilla warfare": Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968

Milne¹

2007

jmh

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This article examines the contribution that Walt Rostow made to the shaping of U.S. military strategy during the second Indochina War. It links Rostow's work as an economic historian with the advice that he dispensed in the field of strategic bombing. In 1964, Rostow explained to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that "Ho [Chi Minh] has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose." Rostow's economic determinism led him to advocate the bombing of North Vietnam more forcefully than any of his civilian colleagues.

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Air Power Versus a Fielded Force: The Misty Facs Of Vietnam and the A-10 Facs of Kosovo a Comparative Analysis

Haun¹

2002

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Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until the USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to effectively attack fielded forces will remain limited.Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine. However, airmen should understand that vi there is no silver bullet for the challenge of target identification. No single piece of equipment or advance in technology will solve the problem. Airmen must first develop the proper doctrine and tactics, then take their equipment and train as realistically as possible. Only then can the USAF reach its potential for defeating an enemy army in the field.vii

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The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. The War in South Vietnam. The Years of the Offensive 1965-1968

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

United States Secret War in Laos: Long-Term Environmental Impacts of the Use of Chemical Weapons

United States Secret War in Laos: Long-Term Environmental Impacts of the Use of Chemical Weapons

"Our equivalent of guerrilla warfare": Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961-1968

Air Power Versus a Fielded Force: The Misty Facs Of Vietnam and the A-10 Facs of Kosovo a Comparative Analysis

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