The US Generalised System of Preferences in Principle and Practice

Blanchard, Emily J.; Hakobyan, Shushanik

doi:10.1111/twec.12216

Cited by 20 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…18. The total value of goods excluded on other country-level grounds, typically intellectual property rights or expropriation violations, was also relatively small compared to CNLbased exclusions (Blanchard and Hakobyan 2015). 19.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at Home: Rights-based Conditionality in Trade Preference Programs

Hafner-Burton

Mosley

Galantucci

2018

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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A growing number of developed country governments link good governance, including human rights, to developing countries’ access to aid, trade, and investment. We consider whether governments enforce these conditions sincerely, in response to rights violations, or whether such conditions might instead be used as a veil for protectionist policies, motivated by domestic concerns about import competition. We do so via an examination of the world’s most important unilateral trade preference program, the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which includes worker rights as one criterion for program access. We argue that the two-tiered structure of the GSP privileges some domestic interests at one level, while disadvantaging them at the other. Using a new data set on all US GSP beneficiary countries and sanctioning measures from 1986 to 2013, we demonstrate that labor rights outcomes play a role in the maintenance of country-level trade benefits and that import competition does not condition the application of rights-based criteria at this level. At the same, however, the US government does not consider worker rights in the elements (at the country-product level) of the program that have the greatest material impact. The result is a situation in which the US government talks somewhat sincerely at the country level in its rights-based conditionality, but its behavior at the country-product level cheapens this talk.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at Home: Rights-based Conditionality in Trade Preference Programs

Hafner-Burton

Mosley

Galantucci

2018

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…The GSP is specific to each grantor and, as for FTAs, GSP beneficiaries must also satisfy RoO requirements that are at least as stringent as those under FTAs. Blanchard and Hakobyan (2015) document the extensive discretion and arbitrariness in GSP market access to the US across countries, products, and time. In the case of Jordan and the EU GSP, under EU GSP regulation 978/2012, Jordan is 'eligible' but not a 'beneficiary' of GSP.…”

Section: Preferences and Origin Requirements Under Eujfta And Jusftamentioning

confidence: 99%

How Much Market Access? A Case Study of Jordan's Exports to the EU

Brunelin¹,

Mélo

Portugal-Pérez³

2018

World Trade Review

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The value of preferential market access schemes has fallen sharply. Drawing on a relaxation announcement of July 2016 simplifying origin requirements for access to the EU that should help improve market access, thereby contributing to alleviate the refugee crisis in Jordan, this paper argues that a simplification of origin requirements is a straightforward way to enhance preferential market access. Yet, the EU decision limits the beneficiaries who must be located in designated special economic zones, which limits preferential market access. The paper compares the performance of Jordanian exports to the EU and the US under their respective FTAs. It shows that Jordanian exports to the US have grown more rapidly than exports to the EU over the last 15 years. The study documents lower utilisation of preferences in the EU than in the US, especially in Textiles and Apparel (T&A) in spite of non-negligible preferences. Three contributing factors are identified: (i) higher adjusted preferences for apparel in the US than in the EU; (ii) greater competition from other suppliers (mostly from LDCs) in the EU market than in the US market; (iii) simpler origin requirements in the case of the Jordan–US FTA. Comparative evidence from the two FTAs and econometric estimates suggest that this should help restore market access for Jordanian exports to the EU. These estimates provide additional evidence that origin requirements suppress market access. Other pathways to simplify origin requirements are offered in the conclusion.

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“…In particular, a country must not be communist, respect worker rights, recognize arbitral awards in favor of the U.S., and be "developing" (UNCTAD, 2016). The U.S. uses discretionary exclusions at the country-product level extensively, perceptibly affecting the GSP beneficiary (Blanchard and Hakobyan, 2015;Carnegie, 2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Politicized trade: What drives withdrawal of trade preferences?

Gassebner

Gnutzmann‐Mkrtchyan

2018

Economics Letters

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWhile it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grant political favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policy towards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revoking of U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whether political friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politically aligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they are significantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.

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The US Generalised System of Preferences in Principle and Practice

Cited by 20 publications

References 8 publications

Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at Home: Rights-based Conditionality in Trade Preference Programs

Protecting Workers Abroad and Industries at Home: Rights-based Conditionality in Trade Preference Programs

How Much Market Access? A Case Study of Jordan's Exports to the EU

Politicized trade: What drives withdrawal of trade preferences?

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