Analogical, or case-based reasoning has received quite a bit of attention in the literature on foreign policy decision-making. There has been little attention paid to whether analogical reasoning does indeed predominate or to what degree abstract reasoning plays a role in the decisionmaking process. If decision-makers do not primarily reason by analogy (an empirical question), then the focus on such reasoning runs the risk of ignoring important aspects of problem formulation and the scope of possible solutions considered. Hence, this article investigates the degree to which decision-makers employ analogical and abstract reasoning.The empirical data are from the Senate hearing regarding the first American program for development aid. This case permits an empirical assessment of the consensus in the foreign aid literature that the Marshall Plan was the central analogy for this aid. In addition, it has been argued that in public discourse, decision-makers should be expected to use analogies as justifications for their preferences. The study finds a preference for explanation-based reasoning and discusses some of the implications of these findings.Analogical, or case-based reasoning plays an important role in explanations of decision-making processes in foreign policy (Jervis). However, in cognitive psychology researchers are not convinced that analogical reasoning can account for the entire scope of human reasoning. They recognize that both analogical and abstract reasoning play a role (Nosofsky, Clark, and Shin, 1989;Ahn, Brewer, and Mooney, 1992; Smith, Langston, and Nisbett, 1992;Wattenmaker, McQuaid, and Schwertz, 1995). The assumption that decisionmakers reason by analogy (and to investigate only which analogies are chosen) runs the risk of ignoring important aspects of how problems are framed and how solutions emerge. Hence, this article asks to what degree decision-makers do