The Use of Recollection Rejection in the Misinformation Paradigm

Abstract

The purpose of this research was to determine the role of recollection rejection in the rejection of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we examined the use of recollection rejection to reject contradictory and additive misinformation. We measured recollection rejection by comparing misinformation acceptance rates, graphing confidence-accuracy data using phantom receiver operating characteristic curves, examining high confidence rejections of misinformation, and examining self-report responses. These measures converged on the finding that participants used recollection rejection to reject both types of misinformation but used recollection rejection more on contradictory misinformation. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the delay between the event and misinformation and between misinformation and test. The length of both of these delays affected misinformation acceptance. Participants were more likely to use recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation after a short delay before encountering misinformation. Overall these findings indicate that people can spontaneously induce recollection rejection to reject misinformation and prevent false memories.

Children's Use of Memory Editing Strategies to Reject Source Misinformation

“…In adults, recollection-based rejection strategies have been studied in eyewitness suggestibility paradigms (Loftus, 1979;Moore & Lampinen, 2016;Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997;Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). For instance, Moore and Lampinen (2016) found that adults use recollection rejection to reject misinformation. These findings suggest the possibility that children may also use these strategies to reject suggested information about a witnessed event.…”

Reducing suggestibility to additive versus contradictory misinformation in younger and older adults via divided attention and/or explicit error detection

“…Prior research has examined qualitative characteristics of misleading content that can influence subsequent suggestibility, such as how central versus peripheral the misleading details are to the original event (Luna & Migueles, ; Wilford, Chan, & Tuhn, ; Wright & Stroud, ). Here, we also examine qualitative characteristics of misleading items by contrasting two types of misinformation that have been studied less frequently (Frost, ; Huff & Umanath, ; Moore & Lampinen, ; Nemeth & Belli, ): contradictory and additive. Contradictory misinformation refers to suggested misleading details that are discrepant with specific details that were originally presented (e.g., the stop/yield sign discrepancy in the classic misinformation paradigm).…”

“…Until recently (Huff & Umanath, ; Moore & Lampinen, ), differences between contradictory and additive misinformation had not been systematically compared despite both types producing large misinformation effects (Frost, ; Nemeth & Belli, ; Saunders & Jess, ). Huff and Umanath () presented younger and older adults with a fictional story followed by misleading questions that contained additive and contradictory details that were systematically counterbalanced across misinformation type and participants.…”

“…Huff and Umanath () presented younger and older adults with a fictional story followed by misleading questions that contained additive and contradictory details that were systematically counterbalanced across misinformation type and participants. Additive misinformation was falsely recognized as being in the original narrative at a much higher rate than contradictory misinformation across age groups (see also, Moore & Lampinen, ), but interestingly, older adults were less susceptible to contradictory misinformation than were younger adults. The authors reasoned that older adults were vigilant towards misinformation by successfully detecting contradictory misinformation (e.g., MacKay, Abrams, & Pedroza, ; Schwartz, ; Umanath & Marsh, ), even without instructions to do so.…”

“…However, detecting additive and contradictory errors may hinge on very different processes both at exposure and at retrieval due to the basic nature of the error types—one, a novel detail and, another, a changed detail. For example, Moore and Lampinen () found that recollection rejection, a metacognitive process wherein participants recollect specific details from the original event to reject misinformation, is more likely to occur for contradictory than additive misinformation.…”