The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue

Fu, Hu; Liaw, Christopher; Randhawa, Sikander

doi:10.48550/arxiv.1905.03773

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…Running VCG with these additional bidders achieves a 2-approximation. Recently, Fu et al [2019] show that in the non-identical regular setting, with a small amount of information about each distribution (e.g., a sample, or the median), one can then pick a single distribution to duplicate and run VCG with to achieve a 10-approximation to the optimal revenue in the original setting. Some recent work present results for a single item in a dynamic setting [Liu and Psomas, 2016].…”

Section: Additional Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets

Babaioff¹,

Goldner²,

Gonczarowski³

2020

Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

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We consider the problem of welfare (and gains-from-trade) maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no feasible (individually rational, truthful, and budget balanced) mechanism that has welfare as high as the optimal-yet-infeasible VCG mechanism, which attains maximal welfare but runs a deficit. On the other hand, the optimal feasible mechanism needs to be carefully tailored to the Bayesian prior, and even worse, it is known to be extremely complex, eluding a precise description.In this paper we present Bulow-Klemperer-style results to circumvent these hurdles in doubleauction market settings. We suggest using the Buyer Trade Reduction (BTR) mechanism, a variant of McAfee's mechanism, which is feasible and simple (in particular, it is deterministic, truthful, prior-independent, and anonymous). First, in the setting in which the values of the buyers and of the sellers are sampled independently and identically from the same distribution, we show that for any such market of any size, BTR with one additional buyer whose value is sampled from the same distribution has expected welfare at least as high as the optimal-yetinfeasible VCG mechanism in the original market.We then move to a more general setting in which the values of the buyers are sampled from one distribution, and those of the sellers from another, focusing on the case where the buyers' distribution first-order stochastically dominates the sellers' distribution. We present both upper bounds and lower bounds on the number of buyers that, when added, guarantees that BTR in the augmented market have welfare at least as high as the optimal in the original market. Our lower bounds extend to a large class of mechanisms, and all of our positive and negative results extend to adding sellers instead of buyers. In addition, we present positive results about the usefulness of pricing at a sample for welfare maximization (and more precisely, for gains-fromtrade approximation) in two-sided markets under the above two settings, which to the best of our knowledge are the first sampling results in this context. * Microsoft Research 9 Moreover, the result fails even for some pair of regular distributions, a condition that is used in the proof of the BK result.10 In the absence of any prior, it is natural to treat all agents the same, and thus anonymity is a natural assumption, and one may even claim that it is in a sense a prerequisite for simplicity.

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Section: Additional Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%